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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the hermeneutic framework of St. Augustine of Hippo. Study of this topic 
has been suggested by patrologists such as Frances Young, and garnered occasional glances in 
contemporary scholarship. Little has been done as far as a systematic treatment of Augustine’s 
theory of hermeneutics in favor of theological/doctrinal issues.  
This thesis begins with a contextualization of the hermeneutic of late antiquity, then follows 
Augustine’s analysis of the three-fold schema of language: res, verbum, and dicibile.  Primary 
texts for these topics are On Christian Doctrine, Against the Academic Skeptics, and The 
Teacher. Secondary literature specifically on this topic and texts is sparse, though a few scholars 
have addressed papers to the query. 
This thesis is written in dialogue with contemporary theological hermeneutics, with the view that 
a pre-modern hermeneutic schema can be a valuable interlocutor in the continuing development 
of post-modern thought. Additionally, the human need to identify, interpret, and apply meaning 
is a perennial struggle, and an influential thinker/writer of late antiquity can aid in the 
contemporary development of a holistic interpretive/epistemological framework without falling 
to false dichotomies and deterministic methodologies.  
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Introduction 
In St. Augustine’s writings, it is difficult to stray very far from his conception of sign and 
semantics. Later authors have rarely explored his work on signification, though it is an essential 
foundation of his thought.   
Chief among these is Augustine’s discussion of the meanings of Scripture, but the 
concept enters into such diverse fields of his interests as his theory of language, 
his discussion of miracles, of the relation of the world to God, and of Man’s way 
of acquiring knowledge, not least knowledge of himself.1 
Though not always explicitly stated, language itself is essential to the philosophical 
thought and theological development of his works. For Augustine, language is not simply a 
pragmatic tool for social interaction – but rather a foundational aspect of being human in the 
world. It is the function that enables humanity to understand themselves, the exterior world, and 
ultimately, for Augustine, humanity’s Creator. It is not only a semantic field, but an 
epistemological one; the key to the ego, inter-subjectivity, and the metaphysical alike.  
The field of hermeneutics has overlooked the possible contribution that pre-modern 
interpreters can make to the field.  Thiselton writes “...the pre-history of [semiotics] throws up 
none of the most sensitive issues.”2 He mentions, however, that “Augustine noted the capacity of 
 
1 R. A. Markus, “St. Augustine on Signs,” Phronesis 2, no. 1 (1957): 1. 
2Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992), 83. 
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signs to point beyond themselves, and like Locke, viewed linguistic signs as identifying markers 
of thoughts or ideas.”3   
Hermeneutics considers its birth as part of the modern era; typically, it is attributed to 
Schleiermacher. While that may be true of interpretation as a study guided by scientific 
methodology, the study and critical reflection of human interpretation and understanding of texts 
(or utterances in general) has been a regular occurrence long before Aristotle penned his 
‘Poetics’. 
For the field of theological hermeneutics there are two primary concerns; the first is 
interpretation of scripture, and the second is apologia to the wider field of philosophy.  Before 
Schleiermacher, the role of hermeneutics was “to support, secure, and clarify an already accepted 
understanding”4 of traditional church interpretation and teaching.  For modern philosophical 
hermeneutics, tradition cannot be a valid arbiter of interpretation, understanding or truth; as a 
result, large swaths of historical theology and hermeneutics have been necessarily marginalized. 
The questions of the post-modern culture, however, are different than the commitments of the 
modern scholar. This difference has sparked a renewed interest by scholars such as Frances 
Young5 in critically examining these influential pre-modern authors.  
 
3 Thiselton, 83. 
4 Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980), 5. 
5 Frances Young, “Augustine’s Hermeneutics and Postmodern Criticism,” Interpretation 58, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 
42–55, https://doi.org/10.1177/002096430405800105. 
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Contemporary interpreters may be skeptical or even suspicious toward possible 
contributions of these pre-modern writers. Of course, there is historical distance, but also an 
assumption that anything prior to the enlightenment (or at least pre-dating Martin Luther) 
subscribes to a naïve and simplistic understanding of the world. There is also a suspicion based 
on underlying presuppositions caused by issues arising from the church as an institution. A 
reader would do well to recall that Augustine was not the harbinger of institutional tradition for 
centuries; he was simply a contemplative individual wrestling with the issues of his time. Just as 
Thiselton and Vanhoozer endeavor to address perceived challenges from their Sitz im Leben, 
Augustine saw gaps in his context and sought to provide counterpoints. 
This thesis is not about appropriating the thoughts of St. Augustine of Hippo, or “re-
contextualizing” his views according to a particular agenda—philosophical, theological, or 
otherwise. This is an argument that Augustine, and by extension his pre-modern cohort, have 
something to offer the contemporary conversation. His thought and writing have inescapably 
tinted the landscape of western tradition. The very shape of the Christian Church owes a debt to 
St. Augustine who contributed to its great Schism. Theology, Catholic and Protestant alike, has 
been founded, rebutted, reformed, and revived using his argumentation.  
Likewise, philosophy cannot escape his influence. In an essential history of philosophy, 
Augustine stands alone in a nineteen-hundred-year gap between Aristotle and Descartes. 
Thinkers as diverse as Thomas Aquinas and Jacques Derrida lament and laud, refute and re-
imagine, chafe against and co-opt the ideas of this late-antiquarian. 
Yet for all of this, exploration of the Grund of his thought has been curiously sparse. His 
contemplation of the issues of time, self, the Godhead, the Church, the world, morality, sin, and 
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grace, have been examined ad nauseum since he took up his pen. In all of this, save an 
occasional mention and rare project has scholarship considered the thread that runs through the 
tapestry of his worldview, faith, contemplation and writing – language and meaning.  
Though modern hermeneutics began as an ecclesial discussion in the early-nineteenth 
century, it evolved into the post-modern doubt that any real understanding or subsequent claims 
of truth are possible.   By the end of the twentieth century, theologians saw hermeneutics as the 
current cultural battleground; Derrida’s literary deconstruction was tantamount to Nietzsche’s 
declaration “God is dead”. “Deconstruction is the death of God put into writing”,6 wrote Carl 
Raschke in 1993. 
Hermeneutics and the human sciences appear to have reached a dead end in 
postmodernity only because an alternative to the Cartesian subject was not 
forthcoming. A viable alternative, the communicative agent, is now available, 
however… The crux of the matter is this: communicative agents are not 
disembodied minds but embodied persons who form part of a language 
community.7 
 
 Is it possible that a writer from sixteen-hundred years ago can contribute to the 
contemporary situation? In this thesis, I will argue that Augustine is not only a valuable 
interlocutor—but is already in the background of the discussion. While contemporary 
contributors to hermeneutics are not concerned directly with his views of language, they rely on 
 
6 Carl A. Raschke as quoted in Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the 
Morality of Literary Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1998), 30. 
7 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary 
Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1998), 231. 
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the previous generation of philosophers, who explicitly use Augustine to develop core aspects of 
their response to modernity.  
 Not only is Augustine already in the background of contemporary debates, but in his own 
texts has considered issues that are currently unaddressed or unresolved. On his own terms, he 
has wrestled with the ramifications of both collapsing and severing the relationship between 
Being and language. These are perennial issues, and ones for which he has established holistic, 
inter-disciplinary solutions. The argument need not be whether his answers to these problems are 
the only or even best available; the argument is that he has anticipated the issues of post-modern 
debate and provided an answer for them for his own context. As such, Augustine deserves a seat 
at the table as an interlocutor, his works deserve honest contextual examination and due 
consideration for points of contemporary engagement. 
 With this goal in mind, an attempt was made to avoid overlaying a foreign theoretical 
framework on Augustine and his writings in search of confirmation or refutation. Rather, a 
Gadamerian approach was attempted to address “questions that arise,” rather than “free-floating 
problems.” For “…only when we understand the question to which something is the answer,” 
can we say we understand without “remain[ing] foregrounded against our own intention.”8 The 
intention is to be hermeneutic in methodology as well as content. Thus, a discursive approach 
has been taken, following three of Augustine’s texts relating to language and its relation to 
 
8 Hans-Georg Gadamer, as quoted by Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2007), 4. 
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Being: On Christian Doctrine, The Teacher, and Against the Academic Skeptics.9 As primary 
contemporary interlocutors, Anthony C. Thiselton, and Kevin J. Vanhoozer have been chosen for 
two primary reasons: first, they have placed an emphasis on understanding and addressing the 
wider issues of general hermeneutics, and second, they have contributed to developing the field 
of theological hermeneutics. 
 This thesis will begin by developing the context in which Augustine practiced by 
examining the inherited hermeneutic approach(s) of late antiquity. Following, will be a 
consideration of how language relates to ontology and Augustine’s theory of reference in 
response to that dynamic. Next, the issue of skepticism, its morality, and its relationship to 
signification will be taken up. Finally, the issue of the author as communicative agent, and the 
content of signs will be considered. 
  
 
9 De doctrina christiana, hereafter Doc. chr.; De magistro, hereafter Mag.; Contra Academicos, hereafter C. Acad. 
All titles, translations and abbreviations for Augustine’s works are from Mark Vessey and Shelly Reid, eds., A 
Companion to Augustine, Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). 
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1. Augustine’s Hermeneutic Context 
Introductory texts on hermeneutics refer to pre-modern interpretation variously as ‘mystical,’ 
‘allegorical,’ or ‘pre-critical.’ Often these terms are ambiguous and used interchangeably, though 
they were distinct interpretive traditions.10  Jean Grondin is a rare author in the genre by even 
taking a few pages to sketch the Hellenic origins of the allegorical tradition and note that there was 
an opposing school of thought based in Antioch.11  
In New Horizons in Hermeneutics, Thiselton dedicates a chapter to “Pre-Modern Biblical 
Interpretation: Hermeneutics of Tradition” but does little to address the topic itself. He 
comparatively analyzes the role of tradition in pre-modern, modern, and post-modern 
hermeneutics.12 He includes a paragraph summary of the Quadriga, or four-fold interpretation of 
scripture.13 His primary concern is the defeat of gnosticism by Irenaeus; he approves of the use 
of the rule of faith, as well as the appeal to the canon for setting a horizon. Thiselton holds other 
 
10 E.g. Milton S. Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1979). 
11 Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994). 
12 “On the basis of belief in God, trust assumes the kind of methodological role which doubt assumes for modernism 
as exemplified in Cartesian rationalism, and which suspicion assumes for post-modernism in socio-critical 
hermeneutics and in deconstructionism.” Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 1992), 143 (Italics original). 
13 litera gesta docet: quid credas allegoria. Moralis quid agis: quo tendas anagogia: The letter teaches what has 
been done, the allegory what you are to believe, the moral what you must do, and the anagogy where you are 
heading. F. F. Bruce, “The History of New Testatment Study,” in New Testament Interpretation: Essays on 
Principles and Methods, ed. I. Howard Marshall (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 28. 
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approaches under suspicion, “One weakness in Irenaeus’s interpretative practice was his 
willingness to resort to allegorical interpretation…”14  Despite his doubts about the practice, he 
does make note of a significant difference between the use of allegory between the early 
Christians and Greek and Jewish exegetes.15  
The Hellenic Greeks and the Jewish scholars of antiquity, such as Philo of Alexandria, 
employed allegory to broaden meaning. They sought to ‘demythologize’, ‘de-objectify’, and ‘de-
particularize’ the meaning from texts. They sought to develop secular meanings and applications 
from ancient religious texts. Conversely, early Christian allegorists sought to narrow the meaning 
of ancient religious texts to specifically Christological application.16 Thiselton’s primary 
exemplar of the period is Origen, with a tentative assessment that he “operates with varying 
degrees of hermeneutical success and failure, depending largely on his aim in particular cases.”17 
He does, however, make a brief mention of a caveat to the genre of allegory, the “Antiochene 
Fathers” and their “greater emphasis on history and related suspicion of polyvalent meaning.”18  
 
14 Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 155. 
15 Alister McGrath discusses differences between the Alexandrians and Antiochenes, but only in reference to their 
Christologies, not their hermeneutic approach. Alister E. McGrath, Historical Theology: An Introduction to the 
History of Christian Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 1998). 
16 Thiselton, 158. 
17 Thiselton, 171. 
18 Thiselton, 172. 
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Alexandrian School 
The Alexandrian school is generally associated with allegory and considered to be instituted by 
Philo. This school developed its interpretive schema from the Greek through the Judaic and into 
early Christian traditions.  Even in his own time, Philo’s allegoresis was considered excessive in 
its focus on looking beyond the text and into the ‘spiritual’ meaning; nevertheless, his style of 
interpretation seems to have become the archetype for the practice. In reality, this tradition had a 
rich critical heritage from which to draw. 
Augustine’s own use of allegory, as applied to scripture, can result in a bewildering array 
of meanings, especially to a modern interpreter influenced by Julicher. The allegorical schema 
that marked much of the early church teaching used biblical texts as narrative templates that 
could be typologically transferred to fit contemporaneous issues. 
As an example, Augustine refers to the narrative of Sarah and Hagar19 several times in 
different ways to further differing arguments.  In City of God, Augustine traced the development 
of the Earthly and Heavenly Cities in Book XV.  Here, following the Apostle Paul’s allegorical 
lead in his Epistle to the Galatians,20 the distinction is made between Sarah and her children of 
promise, and Hagar and her children of slavery.  Hagar, as a slave, was connected to Mount Sinai 
and the Mosaic Covenant and bore children into slavery under the Law.  Sarah, as the free 
 
19 Genesis 16.21. 
20 Galatians 4.21-31. 
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woman, equated to the Heavenly Jerusalem, and bore children in Grace under the New 
Covenant.  
Augustine’s Earthly City was prefigured by Hagar; the city and its inhabitants are “by 
nature vitiated by sin”.21  Born of flesh and natural law, Ishmael was destined to remain under 
the slavery of natural law in the Earthly City.  Isaac, however, was born of miraculous grace to 
the free woman Sarah; as such, he is free to enjoy the “divine kindness”22 of the Heavenly City.   
Sarah’s barrenness and old age also figured into Augustine’s allegory; under the natural 
law of the Earthly City, she had no reason to hope for children of her own.  In the grace of the 
Heavenly City, she was blessed with offspring to be “vessels of mercy.”23 Thus, Augustine 
claims that Isaac and his children “typify the children of grace, the citizens of the free city, who 
dwell together in everlasting peace, in which self-love and self-will have no place, but a 
ministering love that rejoices in the common joy of all, of many hearts makes one, that is to say, 
secures a perfect concord.”24  Ishmael and his descendants in the Earthly City, are destined for 
discord, strife, and eventually – to be ‘cast out’, as was Hagar. 
Elsewhere, Augustine develops the Hagar/Sarah narrative differently.  In his commentary 
on Galatians he explains Paul’s use of Hagar as representing the Old Testament, and Sarah 
 
21 City of God; Book XV s.2. Augustine of Hippo, City of God, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Marcus Dods, vol. 2, A 
Select Library of the Christian Church 1 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 2004). Hereafter, Civ. Dei. 
22 Civ. Dei, XV.2. 
23 Civ. Dei, XV.3 
24 Civ. Dei, XV.2 
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prefiguring the New Testament.25  Augustine again develops the allegory beyond Paul’s usage. 
“Augustine also recognizes here that Abraham had more than two sons, namely those born to 
Keturah, and he finds even in these sons some figura of the future, namely, a foreshadowing of 
heresies and schisms.”26  There is also, in the conflict between Ishmael and Isaac, a 
foreshadowing of persecution of Christians by the Jews.27   
The allegorization of the Sarah/Hagar narrative is a recurring theme in many of 
Augustine’s writings including: On the Gospel of John 11, Psalm 119, his Epistles 93, 185, 196, 
his Answer to the Jews and his refutations of the Manichean and Donatist heresies.28  In his 
response to the Manicheans, he draws on the pride of Ishmael (the son of a slave) in “playing”29 
with Isaac (the true heir) as a factor for being cast out of his father’s household.  To the 
Donatists, he takes a very different approach.  In response to the contentious issue of re-baptism, 
“Augustine applies the treatment of Hagar to the Donatists, telling them that even if they have 
suffered corporal punishment through the Catholic Church, they have suffered as Hagar at the 
hand of Sarah; she was told to return to her mistress.”30  
We can see, by Augustine’s varied use of this single biblical narrative, that he used terms 
interchangeably with other narratives.  At times he would use characters as signs for other 
 
25 Wendy E Helleman, “‘Abraham Had Two Sons’: Augustine and the Allegory of Sarah and Hagar (Galatians 4:21-
31),” Calvin Theological Journal 48, no. 1 (April 2013): 35–64. 
26 Helleman, 48f. 
27 Helleman, 49. 
28 Helleman, 52. 
29 Genesis 21.9. 
30 Helleman, “‘Abraham Had Two Sons,’” 56. 
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concepts – such as Sarah and Hagar for New/Old Testaments and Covenants.  In other instances, 
characters would be discarded for use of basic plot – as in the abuse and return of Hagar as a 
moral model for the Donatists.  In several circumstances (such as his use in City of God) 
Augustine used Paul’s allegorizing in Galatians as license to further extend the metaphor to suit 
various theological arguments.  At times, it seems that this allegorizing was limited only by 
imagination and intent.  Augustine, however, did not hold this hermeneutic to be without limit.  
Augustine’s practice of interpreting scripture was not spontaneously generated; he stood 
“broadly speaking, in the Alexandrian tradition of Biblical interpretation.”31  Influenced by the 
preaching of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, he was drawn to “the techniques and insights of Greek 
exegetes in the tradition of Philo and Origen.”32  This was a well-established methodology that 
drew on Platonic philosophy, interpretive traditions of Homeric poetry, Hebrew Scripture, and 
Rabbinic scholarship.  Origen’s interpretive program has been traditionally understood as it is 
laid out in De Principiis with the following five principles. 
1. “Literal” interpretation was attributed to the Jews, Christians are to seek the spiritual 
meaning. 
2. Based on Philo’s tripartite division of the human (body, soul, spirit), there are three 
levels of meaning – literal, moral, and spiritual. 
 
31 Richard A. Norris, “Augustine and the Close of the Ancient Period,” in A History of Biblical Interpretation, ed. 
Alan J. Hauser and Duane F. Watson, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 386. 
32 Norris, 382. 
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3. In instances where no coherent literal sense was apparent, Christians are called to 
look for spiritual meaning. 
4. In the Jewish spirit of the importance of every “jot and tittle”, Origen sought 
allegorical meanings in the minutest details. 
5. The Holy Spirit imparted truth concealed in a narrative about the created order so that 
spiritual truths could be discovered.33 
The above program for interpretation appears to set no horizon on the possible meaning 
of texts.  It establishes the ‘literal’ meaning (or meaning at the level of text/fact/referent) as a 
remedial meaning; requiring that an interpreter go beyond the text itself to find a ‘spiritual 
meaning’.  Any meaning that could be ascribed to any of three ‘levels’ and attached remotely to 
the smallest term of the narrative, could be legitimized.  This does seem more like hermeneutical 
anarchy than any method on which the early church could base its theology.   
More recent analysis finds that there are more underlying principles in the Alexandrian 
school than in this understanding of Origen.  Frances Young notes, that in De Principiis, Origen 
is not systematically expositing his own hermeneutic, but rather delivering an apology for broad 
Christian understandings of scripture.  Indeed, in chapters one though seven of Book IV, Origen 
developed an apologia for Christ as the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy and law, as well 
as the authority of those writings to bear witness to Him.  Origen is also “justifying controversial 
aspects of Christian interpretation rather than giving an account of exegetical methodology.”34  
 
33 Adapted from, Frances Young, “Alexandrian and Antiochene Exegesis,” in A History of Biblical Interpretation 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 335. 
34 Young, 338. 
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Young’s second argument is that Origen dedicated much of his life to biblical scholarship, and 
De Principiis “provides no description of what he did as a text critic, commentator, and 
preacher.”35 The framework given in De Principiis is not Origen’s own working hermeneutic, 
but rather a broad consideration of wider Christian exegesis. In order to construct the interpretive 
framework of the Alexandrian school, we must look to the Hellenistic system presumed by 
Origen, and later, Augustine.   
Exegetical work was divided in two phases, the first, methodikon, the second historicon.  
In this phase the ‘physical’ text was examined.  Beginning with the handwritten material, text-
critical questions were posed.  Grammar and word choices were observed and critiqued, the 
meanings of archaic words/forms were exhumed. As part of this examination, tropes (figures of 
speech) were identified and explained along with idioms and other linguistic devices.  
For the Greeks, the ‘literal sense’ of the texts encompassed a broader scope than in 
modern hermeneutics.  The usage of tropes could mean that the whole text was metaphorical, 
and a “reading ‘according to the letter’ was wrong”.36   Etymology contributed a whole new set 
of possible meanings, and allegory itself was considered simply another figure of speech.  All 
these potential meanings fell within the scope of the ‘literal’ sense of the text. 
The second phase of Greek exegesis, historikon, is what could be considered 
commentary.  Extra-textual material was applied to help develop and broaden understanding of 
the text. Included in this study would be relevant data such as historical information, 
 
35 Young, 338. 
36 Young, 339. 
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geographical data, and explanations of myths, poetry, and external events referred to by the text.  
Texts were also evaluated based on their rhetorical aspects; if there were different ways to 
express the same concept, then an author’s choice of word, weight and voice bring different 
meanings to the text.  Examination of those rhetorical choices contributed to an in-depth textual 
interpretation.   
A text must also pass moral consideration; Plato and Plutarch’s assessment of the poets 
still held sway over interpretive practice. If a text, action, or narrative character was judged to be 
morally deficient or subversive, it was to be discarded. To defend these deficient texts, meaning 
must be found to lie somewhere other than at the literalistic level, therefore, allegory must be 
applied. 37    
Not simply a matter of philosophical interest, the Alexandrian school was concerned with 
practical applications of interpreting narratives.  “It was important for the budding lawyer to be 
able to challenge the plausibility of narratives… Methods of anaskeue (refutation) and kataskeue 
(conformation) were therefore taught…through the medium of literature.”38  Part of training in 
textual interpretation was to evaluate narratives for cohesion, coherence, and plausibility. While 
this had particular interest to those intending to argue cases in the court of law, it clearly had 
implications for how texts should be treated. A text, whether classical poetry, epic myth, 
historical report, or Holy Scripture, like a narrative in court, was subject to critical evaluation.  A 
 
37 Young, “Alexandrian and Antiochene Exegesis,” 2003. 
38 Young, 340. 
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text must meet certain literal level requirements to hold its own valid textual meaning.  Failing 
these tests, meaning must lie on another level.   
There were certain limits within a text itself to allegorical interpretation.  “Didymus, 
distinguished sense and reference, first at the level of the wording… then at the level of 
figurative discourse… Here a series of traditional “figures” (such as Jerusalem = church) were 
consistently applied.”39 Allegorical interpretation could not be arbitrarily legitimized; consistent 
metaphors and figures must be applied to texts, and only when the text itself signaled, could 
another meaning be sought after.  
The historicity of the passage also set a horizon, “Augustine gives a clear affirmation of 
historical truth; spiritual understanding (sensum intelligentiae spiritualis), should not undermine 
the reality of historical fact.”40 Augustine restricted allegorical use more than his predecessors. 
For example, “Origen and Jerome, as writers who allegorize on the basis of names, [however] 
Augustine affirms clearly that he will not himself indulge in that approach.”41 He was also 
reluctant to sever prophecy from its historical setting. Old Testament prophecy, properly in its 
own context, had a historical and literal fulfillment. This created a different meaning, slightly 
more grounded than allegory; these fulfilled prophecies pre-figured New Testament fulfillment 
in Christ or his new Covenant. 
 
39 Young, 338. 
40 Helleman, “‘Abraham Had Two Sons,’” 46. 
41 Helleman, 40. 
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For exegetes like Augustine, Origen and Jerome, it was assumed “that the Scriptures 
were full of passages or statements that are obscure or even, at first glance, difficult to make 
sense of…”42 When confronted with these plentiful passages, a reader was called by the Divine 
Author to seek a deeper, spiritual meaning. For the Alexandrian school, the narratives of 
scripture were sacred and took prominence in their theology and ethics, but the texts included 
many signals that their meaning must be developed externally.  
Greek exegesis used many tools we associate with modern methodologies. The 
methodikon approach focused on the form of the text by asking text-critical questions, finding 
figures of speech, idioms, tracing etymology and analyzing word choices. Allegory itself, was a 
type of figure of speech and was part of this process. Historikon was the practice of applying 
historical-critical techniques such as assembling pertinent geographical data, information about 
various cultural practices, and contemporaneous external narratives or myths that were alluded to 
in a text.  Rhetorical studies assumed a distinction between the text and the subject matter; the 
interpreter sought to identify the author’s purpose by analysis of the way a text/argument was 
structured.  These interpretive traditions that have often been dismissed as ancient, ‘pre-critical’, 
or naïve spiritualization, in fact, utilize sophisticated critical analysis of texts.  
 
42 Norris, “Augustine and the Close of the Ancient Period,” 391. 
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The Alexandrians, however, were not the only exegetical school of this time.  Lucian, 
known for critical study of scriptures and whose edition of the Septuagint was preferred by the 
eastern church, founded a school in Antioch.43   
Antiochene School 
In modern histories of hermeneutics, there has been a tendency to underestimate the distinctions 
between the Alexandrian and Antiochene schools. This can be attributed to historical 
misunderstandings of use of the term theoria. There are several reasons for this confusion, first, 
there are significant gaps in extant writings of this school. This contributes to the second reason, 
relative disinterest by scholars of theology and patrology. The third reason is that theoria is 
confused or equated with allegory, typology, or sensus plenior. In his History of Hermeneutics, 
Milton Terry refers to “Mystical interpretation” as “Closely allied to the allegorical 
interpretation...” even as he footnotes an objection to conflating the two, as there is a distinction 
between theoria and allegoria.44 Terry, Thiselton, and Grondin45 mention the Antiochenes, but 
offer no explanation or analysis of this school. 
A small collection of scholars since the late-nineteenth century have explored the lacuna 
in work about the distinctive practices of the Antiochene School. The Antiochenes, (whose 
adherents included Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus, and John Chrysostom) referred 
to their hermeneutic approach as theoria. Against the Alexandrian School, they held that textual 
 
43 Milton S. Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1979), 645. 
44 Terry, 164. 
45 See, Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 172.; Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, 32. 
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meaning was located within the literal/historical context; the text was more than just a vehicle for 
the hidden spiritual meaning.   The Antiochenes were staunchly anti-allegory. Diodorus of 
Tarsus cites a significant difference between the Apostle Paul’s use of the term ‘allegory’ (in 
Galatians 4.24) and the Greek-Alexandrian method of allegory, which he asserts is a foreign 
import to scriptural interpretation.46 For the Antiochenes, meaning is found primarily in the 
historical referent of the text.  There were, however, many significant distinctions for the 
Antiochene school’s hermeneutic methodology.   
When commenting on Galatians 4.24,47 Theodore of Mopsuestia accused the 
Alexandrians of “abusing” this “saying of Paul, taking it as authority for destroying all meaning 
from Scripture” and that, “The apostle did not do away with history, nor did he strip away 
actions which had occurred long ago.” 48 Theodore’s understanding of Paul’s use of allegory was 
contrary to the interpretive license the Alexandrians adopted. "Rather, Paul used the account of 
past events to elucidate his own words.”49  
John Chrysostom’s commentary on Galatians shows a commitment to interpreting Paul’s 
intention when he uses the Genesis narrative of Hagar and Sarah.  Chrysostom interprets Paul as 
equating the Judaisers (sons of Abraham ‘in the flesh’) as sons of Hagar.  They, as sons of the 
 
46 Frances Young, “Alexandrian and Antiochene Exegesis,” 341. 
47 “These things are an allegory, for these are the two covenants. The one is from Mount Sinai, which gives birth to 
bondage; she is Hagar.” Galatians, 4.24, Modern English Version. 
48 Theodore of Mopsuestia, as quoted by Robert J Kepple, “Analysis of Antiochene Exegesis of Galatians 4:24-26,” 
The Westminster Theological Journal 39, no. 2 (1977), 241. 
49 Kepple, 241. 
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bondwoman, are bound to the Law given at Mt. Sinai—Hagar’s namesake.50  Theodoret of 
Cyrrhus does not cite this linguistic link, and explains; "alongside that mountain [Sinai] the race 
of Hagar has been dwelling."51  The sons of Sarah are born of spirit, “for the womb was dead 
both through age and barrenness, but the Word of God fashioned Him.”52  The juxtaposition 
drawn between the two is this: “The being born after the flesh renders one not more honorable, 
but less so, for a birth not after the flesh is more marvelous and more spiritual.”53  The Old 
Testament narrative also prefigures the oppression of the sons of Sarah/promise suffered at the 
hand of the sons of Hagar/flesh as typifying the oppression of the early church at the hand of the 
Jews (Galatians 4.29).  Like the bondservant in Genesis, the slaves to the Law will be cast out 
and not share in the inheritance with those born of promise, which Chrysostom explicitly 
identifies as the Gentile church. 
“Observe how the type is preserved in every particular, as the former...so the latter, when 
the fullness of time is come, brings forth.”54 Chrysostom clearly saw Paul’s usage of this 
narrative as more typological than allegorical.  As such, his exegesis sought to join two horizons: 
first, the original event in the context of the Genesis narrative, and second, the theme of Paul’s 
message to the Galatians.  Chrysostom interprets this ‘allegory’ as a further restatement of the 
 
50 Here Chrysostom writes “’Hagar’ is the word for Mount Sinai in the language of that country.” It is noted that this 
claim has not been substantiated. John Chrysostom, “Commentary on Galatians,” in Chrysostom: Homilies on 
Galatians, Etc, ed. Philip Schaff, 4th ed., vol. 13, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 1 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson 
Publishers, Inc., 2004), 34. 
51 Theodoret of Cyrrhus as quoted by Kepple, “Analysis of Antiochene Exegesis of Galatians 4,” 247. 
52 Chrysostom, “Commentary on Galatians,” 34. 
53 Chrysostom, 34. 
54 Chrysostom, 34. 
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shocking theme of overturning Jewish assumptions about Law and inheritance, for the 
superiority of the freedom under adoption through promise in Christ.   
For those that subscribed to Antiochene interpretive methods, theoria was “the divine 
revelation or mystical illumination of spiritual realities which attended the processes of 
inscripturation, interpretation, or homiletical discourse.”55 Theoria encompassed the entire 
process of textual content from transcription to reception. Italian patrologist Alberto Vaccari, in 
the early-twentieth century, identified four facets of theoria that have been referenced since:   
1. Theoria presupposed the historical reality of the events described by 
the biblical author; those events functioned like a mirror imaging a 
different reality.  
2. In addition to the historical reference, theoria simultaneously 
embraced a second future reality, which was ontologically linked to 
the first.  
3. The first or near historical event stood in relation to the second, as the 
mediocre to the perfect, the small to the large, or a sketch to the 
finished work of art.  
4. Both the present and future events together were described as direct 
objects of theoria but in different ways. The present functioned as the 
 
55 As noted in, Bradley Nassif, “The ‘Spiritual Exegesis’ of Scripture: The School of Antioch Revisited,” Anglican 
Theological Review 75, no. 4 (September 1993): 457. 
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less significant vehicle through which the prophet knowingly 
described a greater future event in human history through the use of 
hyperbolic language. 56 
This hermeneutic places the textual author as a witness to a spatio-temporal event.  While 
witnessing the immediate event, the author is (or becomes) aware that a second, distant event, 
will share significant attributes.  Thus, as the author transcribes the text, he/she records the 
event(s) in such a way that recipients will (first) understand the significance of the immediate 
event to the author, and (second) leave the text open to being understood in light of the distant 
event, which details the reader is privy to, though the author is not.57  
The recipient of the text is to set both events as horizons of meaning. The text must be 
understood within the bounds of the historical account and of the significance to the 
witness/author.  The immediate event is simultaneously an inferior type for a latter, superior 
event that distant recipients will presumably recognize.  The meaning and significance of the two 
events will be closely tied, one influencing the understanding of the other. This framework has 
possible contributions to understanding the use of the Old Testament by New Testament authors.   
Vaccari maintained that theoria operated as a creative and highly imaginative way 
of resolving the dilemma which the Antiochene authors faced when confronted 
with the historìa of a biblical text and its later Christological meaning which at 
times could not easily be reconciled with its original historical context.58 
 
56 Nassif, 443. 
57 This bears striking resemblance to Paul Ricoeur’s conception of how the author-text-reader relationship functions. 
58 Nassif, “The ‘Spiritual Exegesis’ of Scripture,” 442. 
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 As we can see, theories of interpretation and of language have never been simplistic.  The 
dreaded post-modern specter of ‘immediacy’ or naiveté never really existed.  Hermeneutics has 
always been a discipline that requires balancing a general theory of communication, 
contemporary theories of history, critical examination of texts, linguistic differences, cultural 
values, and technological issues. Pre-modern interpreters employed critical methodologies, 
however, their priorities, were not the same as those of modern hermeneutics. Historical-critical 
questions were not the end of the process but the beginning of a project of determining textual 
meaning in the horizon of salvation history. This holistic approach to interpretation is what 
Augustine hopes to impart in On Christian Doctrine.59 His theoretical approach to the topic 
ranges across the body of his work. 
Two contemporary authors are influential in developing the area of theological 
hermeneutics, Anthony C. Thiselton and Kevin J. Vanhoozer. Both Thiselton and Vanhoozer 
began their work in hermeneutics in response to issues affecting their primary fields of study.  
Thiselton pursued a response to Bultmannian influences on New Testament studies, specifically 
the “one-sidedness”60 of the New Hermeneutic.  Vanhoozer sought to establish the legitimacy of 
meaning in the skeptical culture of post-modern deconstruction.61  
 
59 Augustine of Hippo, Christian Doctrine, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Marcus Dods, vol. 2, A Select Library of the 
Christian Church, First Series (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 2004). Hereafter, Doc. chr. 
60 Anthony Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” in New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Principles and 
Methods, ed. I. Howard Marshall (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 324–28. 
61 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary 
Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1998). 
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As will be seen, Augustine develops a holistic view of language and signification and 
then focuses that schema toward an andragogy of scripture. In contrast, both Thiselton and 
Vanhoozer typically work from the priority of biblical hermeneutics and have set their concern 
as the “philosophical description”62 of the hermeneutical problem.  By this, they intend to 
explore philosophy for the best explanation of humanity’s process of interpretation.   
In effect, theological hermeneutics, while never losing sight of its teleology, seeks to first 
describe how it is that humans approach the production, interpretation, and comprehension of 
texts in general. “The biblical scholar therefore needs the help of someone who has made it his 
life’s work to wrestle with the problem of how these two sides of the situation [historicality of 
author and interpreter] can be held together, without either being lost to view.”63  With this in 
mind, theological hermeneutics interacts with a vast spectrum of thinkers; all proposals should be 
critically evaluated—and when appropriate—integrated into a comprehensive schema 
establishing the validity of proper interpretation of biblical text and human existence in general.  
 
 
62 Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980). Thiselton recognizes the impact of Augustine on Christian thought and church 
doctrine but does not address his theoretical framework. In Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007)., he mentions Augustine thirty-three times: thirty-one times as a mention of 
doctrinal development, nine of those are simply listed with other contributors, once Confessions is mentioned as a 
speech-act of doctrinal importance, once Doc. chr. II is cited for developing a theory of signification and its 
importance for a doctrine of the sacraments, Augustine is quoted once in his influential discusion of time. Augustine 
is never mentioned in Two Horizons, and once in Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand 
Rapids, MI, 2009). 
63 Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, 1980, 27. 
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2. Relationship Between Ontology and Language 
The first hermeneutic issue that will be addressed is one that Anthony Thiselton found 
particularly troubling – that of the relationship between Being and language. If the relationship 
between the two are conflated, meaning becomes relative, any speech/text can be interpreted 
according to the reader’s projection of reality behind it. If the relationship between Being and 
language is severed altogether (as in deconstruction), meaning becomes lost in an endless series 
of signs.  
To resolve this issue, Thiselton first turns to Martin Heidegger to establish the possibility 
of examining Being. Second, he follows Hans-Georg Gadamer’s development of hermeneutics 
as an experiential epistemology, his connection of ontology to textual hermeneutics, as well as 
his horizons of understanding. What Thiselton omits, and will be shown, is that for Heidegger 
and Gadamer, Augustine is a vital contributor to their philosophical projects. While developing 
the horizons of meaning, Thiselton never really addresses how language and Being relate. He 
dismisses a theory of reference citing Wittgenstein’s objections, and turns instead to speech-act 
theory to address the pragmatic question of why language is used. Augustine, however, offers a 
robust conception of language as reference that will be examined through his dialogue The 
Teacher.  
Establishing Boundaries Between Language and World 
As Thiselton’s counterpoint, the New Hermeneutic represents a major development 
incorporating the demythologizing of Rudolf Bultmann, and the linguistic focus brought about 
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by structuralism and the existentialist thought of the mid-twentieth century. This framework is an 
illustration of what happens when the distinction between language and reality is blurred. 
Thiselton observes, “There is some force in the criticism that the new hermeneutic lets ‘what is 
true for me’ become the criterion of ‘what is true’.”64 Without a distinction between language 
and object, interpretation falls to relativism. The New Hermeneutic movement helped to shift 
hermeneutical focus to the reader which, under deconstructionist’s influence, would become the 
reader-response movement.  
The fundamental problem for Rudolf Bultmann was the distinction between reality and 
language. Two students of Bultmann, Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling, were the primary 
developers and ambassadors for this schema, which intended to set demythologization on 
hermeneutical principle. Their program developed the idea that the mythological language of the 
New Testament obscures, rather than illuminates, the reality behind the text.  
In an effort to establish the relationship between reality and language, Fuchs arrived at 
the conclusion that “The truth of reality appears only in language”.65  While this ‘New 
Hermeneutic’ affirms that there is a reality, it is only accessible through linguistics, “an eternal 
silence would be the abolition of reality”.66  As such, language has primacy over reality. Reality 
cannot simply be “what is,” it must be present in expression and in the presence of the 
 
64 Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” 355. 
65 Paul J Achtemeier, “How Adequate Is the New Hermeneutic,” Theology Today 23, no. 1 (April 1, 1966): 108. 
66 Achtemeier, 107. 
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‘concerned’ subject. “Language which actually conveys reality constitutes a “language-event” 
(Sprachereignis) [for Fuchs], whilst Ebeling uses the term “word-event” (Wortgeschehen) in 
much the same way.”67 
Ebeling writes of the “profound crisis of language,”68 found in the later Heidegger.  He 
attributes the inability for humankind to explore the meaning of Sein to the dualism in western 
thought that goes all the way back to Plato.  By splitting existence in two, separating the spiritual 
and material worlds, our language has become bifurcated as well.  Heidegger’s search for the 
ground of the Being of Dasein is defeated by the linguistics of ‘being’ becoming lost.  “Being as 
the object of thought is merely being-ness (Seiendheit).”69 In essence, western society’s language 
has been so degraded that it simply can no longer function as an expression of actuality.  
“Language is not a mere tool... Rather it is that event which disposes of the supreme possibility 
of human existence.”70   
For Heidegger and the New Hermeneutic, western thought must recover its ability to 
speak (and think) meaningfully about Sein in order to grasp reality.  There are three primary 
obstacles for the New Hermeneutic to overcome: an understanding of logos that divides Being, 
the limitations of western linguistics to express reality as anything other than dualisms, and the 
 
67 Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” 1977, 312. 
68 Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, 1980, 335. 
69 Thiselton, 336. 
70 Thiselton, 334. 
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pervasive reduction of language to subject-object designations. This approach to the 
hermeneutical problem was an attempt to penetrate past problematic language to recover Being. 
Augustine did not have these same issues with which to contend. There is much extant 
discussion of Augustine as a ‘Neo-Platonist’ that infected the discipline of theology with 
‘dualism’. As we will see in Contra Academicos, Augustine is unapologetically a Platonist – the 
question becomes one of what that actually means. Scholarship in the late-twentieth century has 
renewed an effort to map the philosophical landscape of late antiquity. This allows a much more 
detailed account of different schools of thought and reduces the ability “to make generic 
doctrinal comparisons between Christianity and Platonism … since separate Platonist schools—
while sharing a basic family resemblance in their views—held significantly different 
positions.”71 The net effect for the hermeneutic discussion is “the matter of locating Platonism 
with our interpretive categories. In recent years, religious studies scholarship has helped to 
promote salutary circumspection regarding notions like ‘religion,’ ‘philosophy,’ and ‘theology,’ 
terms that had been previously used as natural categories with clear edges.”72 These categorical 
distinctions need to be reconsidered as interpretive frames; for there were no such distinctive 
disciplines for Platonists, Christians, or any other school in antiquity. As part of this more 
nuanced view, the label “Neoplatonism” and its attending attributes may need to be re-evaluated 
for its implication in interpreting authors from late antiquity, Augustine in particular.  
 
71 John Kenney and John Peter Kenney, “‘None Come Closer to Us than These:’ Augustine and the Platonists,” 
Religions 7, no. 9 (September 1, 2016): 2, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel7090114. 
72 Kenney and Kenney, 2. 
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Considering these recent studies, Augustine’s relationship with Plato, Plotinus, and 
Neoplatonism, and their particular dualisms needs to be critically examined. Even City of God, 
the quintessential text for Augustinian dualism, has been re-examined through a more narrative 
hermeneutic approach with dramatically different results.73 Perhaps some of the assumptions of 
Augustinian dualism are well founded within his own text, but only when systematically 
categorized and generically stereotyped. Under a more holistic approach, even Plato is less 
‘Platonic’ than has been traditionally exegeted.  
Kenney and Kenney cite Confessions VII as an essential text for understanding 
Augustine’s view of Platonism.74 First, it shows a clear rejection of his former commitment to 
the materialistic dualism of the Manichaeans; and identifies it not simply as cognitive shortfall, 
but as a moral failing, causing his continuous relapse into anthropomorphizing and materializing 
God. Platonism offered Augustine a framework to escape materialism and grasp the fullness of 
the teaching of the church about God. In Book VII he lists Platonic doctrines and church 
doctrines and critically examines convergences and discontinuities. Here and elsewhere in his 
writings, Augustine shows a critical engagement with values of Plato that aid in Christian 
 
73 Gregory W. Lee, “Republics and Their Loves: Rereading City of God 19.(Report),” Modern Theology 27, no. 4 
(2011): 553–81, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0025.2011.01703.x. 
74 John Kenney and John Peter Kenney, “‘None Come Closer to Us than These:’ Augustine and the Platonists,” 
Religions 7, no. 9 (September 1, 2016): 114, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel7090114. 
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development and theology.75 Even within Platonism, there is a holistic view of philosophy, 
religion, ethics, and polity; this is a value that Augustine does claim regularly. 
As part of the renewed interest and approach to studying late antiquity, among 
patrologists and philologists alike, this topic will continue to evolve. As it evolves, scholars may 
find that some of the theological and philosophical developments that have been traditionally 
attributed (and lamented) to Augustine will need to be redressed. Rants, such as Soren 
Kierkegaard’s accusation that Augustine introduced Platonic intellectualism into the Christian 
faith,76 among countless others, may be rendered obsolete in light of rhetorical and narrative 
examinations of Augustine’s works. The problem of dualisms that the New Hermeneutic finds 
troubling may find a more solid foundation in Cartesian dualism than late antiquity.  
Thiselton, for his part, affirms that these linguistic concerns of the New Hermeneutic are 
essential issues. Theological hermeneutics embraces some ideas the New Hermeneutic 
developed, such as overcoming certain linguistic dualisms, bringing out the gathering 
implications of logos as discourse, and presenting a case for genuine interaction with the New 
Testament text.  Other proposals of the New Hermeneutic are met with less enthusiasm.   
Thiselton’s concern centers around the observation that it is extremely one-sided in its 
focus, “Whilst the new hermeneutic rightly faces the problem of how the interpreter may 
 
75 cf C. Acad. II.5. Augustine of Hippo, Against the Academicians and The Teacher, trans. Peter King (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1995). 
76 As cited by, Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 277. 
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understand the text of the New Testament more deeply and more creatively, Fuchs and Ebeling 
are less concerned about how he may understand it correctly”.77  While appreciating the New 
Hermeneutic’s insistence on placing the text as a subject, it is one-sided to eliminate critical 
examination as part of the hermeneutic circle. 
 For both Thiselton and his New Hermeneutic interlocutors, the reader stands peering 
through language, seeking to grasp the world beyond the text. Thiselton finds the solution to the 
hermeneutic issue in developing the proper role of historical-critical endeavors. In his earlier 
works he commonly asks the question, “What is the role of historical-criticism?” Fuchs and 
Ebeling, while affirming the value of historical research, consider it prior to beginning the 
hermeneutical task. For Thiselton, critical (including historical) thinking should be part of the 
inter-subjective dialogue with the New Testament as a check against wrong understanding.  
Thiselton views the Bultmannian focus on demythologizing as problematic. Specifically, 
because some New Testament discourse is directed to a community that already believes. This 
would mean that it was written by, and addressed to, an audience within a faith tradition. For 
Fuchs, tradition obscures, rather than clarifies, the original proclamation of Jesus. He understood 
this teaching to address unbelievers; therefore, the tradition, even within the New Testament 
itself, is problematic. Just as Heidegger wishes to step back "behind" the conceptualizing 
tradition of western philosophy, so Fuchs wishes to step back "behind" the tradition of the 
 
77 Anthony Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” 1977, 323 (Italics original). 
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primitive church.78 From this position, the language of the text itself is held in suspicion, 
requiring the world behind the text to be re-constructed by the reader. 
For Thiselton and other critics of the New Hermeneutic, this divorce of the text from its 
original situatedness leads to a host of hermeneutical and theological errors.  As Paul Achtemeier 
notes, “The inadequacy of this hermeneutical method in its attempt to get at the true intention of 
the text is shown just as clearly in its attempt to come to terms with the death of Christ”.79  
Without the tradition and historicality of the text, the Cross of Jesus simply becomes the 
affirmation of the existential value of “abandonment of self-assertion”,80  and the resurrection of 
Christ becomes marginalized.  
For Thiselton, the New Hermeneutic is also shown as one-sided in its adopted stance 
toward language itself.  By directly linking language with reality, Fuchs and Ebeling lose sight of 
the fact that language is convention, described by structuralists as the ‘arbitrariness of sign.’81  
While humanity is essentially linguistic, Being is not determined but is described by the signs 
agreed upon by participants in a given ‘language game’. Detractors of the New Hermeneutic 
equate the ‘word-event’ with ‘word-magic’; they compare Fuchs and Ebeling’s fusion of 
 
78 Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” 324. 
79 Achtemeier, “How Adequate Is the New Hermeneutic,” 115. 
80 Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” 325. 
81 As developed by Ferdinand de Saussure 
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language and reality with that of some primitive cultures, where it is believed that by saying 
something it will become real.   
This linguistic dilemma is also troubling for critics in the way that the Word of God 
becomes bound to the word of humanity.  “Does Ebeling's notion of word-event allow for an 
integration of divine and human action in such a way as to maintain the integrity of both?”82  The 
concern becomes an issue of the ‘otherness’ of God; if His speech to humanity, (the language of 
reality or Being), is determined by humanity’s own utterance, how can this language be properly 
kerygmatic?   
The second linguistic issue of the New Hermeneutic is the way it prioritizes language that 
elicits active response over descriptive language. Thiselton quotes Ebeling, "We do not get at the 
nature of words by asking what they contain, but by asking what they effect, what they set 
going."83  As a proponent of speech-act theory, he does not want his critique to be understood as 
against Ebeling’s “concern with function, with communication, with self-involvement”.84  He 
wants to caution against predetermining that “description undermines other functions of 
language”,85 the single focus on eliciting a word-event minimizes the informative and descriptive 
content of language.  Thiselton points out the danger of this in quoting Amos Wilder:  
 
82 William R. Barr, “Word of God and Word of Man in Word-Event,” Lexington Theological Quarterly 4, no. 4 
(October 1, 1969): 132. 
83 Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” 326. 
84 Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” 326. 
85 Thiselton, 326. 
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Fuchs refuses to define the content of faith . . . He is afraid of the word as 
convention or as a means of conveying information . . . Fuchs carries this so far 
that revelation, as it were, reveals nothing ... Jesus calls, indeed, for decision . . . 
But surely his words, deeds, presence, person, and message rested . . . upon 
dogma, eschatological and theocratic.86 
Thiselton leads us to the question, “How can the interpreter, in the absence of information 
about the ‘world’ of the original proclamation establish anything more than the linguistic 
existence of a ‘call’?”87  With no external description of the content of that call, the interpreter is 
forced to supply a framework for faith from within him/herself.  In effect, the text of the New 
Testament simply becomes a hermeneutical mirror, in which the reader can only see his/her own 
reflection. 
Heidegger’s Ontology of Dasein 
To rescue the possibility of meaning in language, Thiselton combines the ontology of Dasein of 
early Heidegger, the language-games of (later) Wittgenstein, and the hermeneutic circle of 
Gadamer. As a starting point, Thiselton works to overcome the subject/object dualism through 
the analysis of Dasein of Martin Heidegger. He carefully navigates through four different 
interpretations of Heidegger’s work.88 First, he rejects the view that Heidegger, with Karl 
Jaspers, founded German existentialism, instead “By his own account Heidegger is first and last 
and always not an existentialist at all, but an ontologist: one who would restore Being to its 
 
86 Wilder, as quoted by Thiselton, 326. 
87 Thiselton, 326. 
88 Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, 1980, Chapter VI. 
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rightful place in our thought.”89 Second, Heidegger cannot be understood as simply approaching 
the problem from a Greek viewpoint, as has been suggested by some after placing priority on his 
commentaries on pre-Socratic philosophy. He, by his own statement, uses the Greek 
philosophers to criticize his own contemporary situation,90 namely Cartesian conceptions of 
ontology. “…We must show explicitly that Descartes not only goes amiss ontologically in his 
definition of the world, but that his interpretation and its foundations led him to pass over the 
phenomenon of world, as well as the being of innerworldly being initially at hand.”91  
Third, Heidegger cannot be understood simply in terms of Husserl’s phenomenology. 
Heidegger did use phenomenological methods of analysis; however, it is important to note that 
“Husserl repudiated Heidegger’s use of his phenomenological method.”92 Thiselton lists three 
distinctions, but the underlying disjunction between them is that Husserl firmly retained a 
subject/object dichotomy and Heidegger was attempting to overturn it.   
Thiselton adopts Magda King’s four point understanding of Heidegger. First, the question 
of Being is meaningful, even in the universality of the concept. Second, defining Being is not 
going to function the same as other definitions because Being is not an entity. Third, we must 
 
89 Marjorie Grene, as quoted by Thiselton, 144. 
90 Thiselton, 144. 
91 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental 
Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2010), 93. 
92 Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, 1980, 145. 
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have some sense of the meaning of Being because we know enough to further seek after its 
definition.93  
King’s fourth point is that Heidegger makes a crucial distinction between ontological and 
ontic questions. “Ontological inquiry concerns Being (Sein); ontic inquiries concern ‘entities’ or 
‘existents’ (das Seiende).”94 In the discussion of this distinction, in the first introduction to Being 
and Time, Heidegger introduces his concept of Dasein. Dasein is unique in the category of Being 
in that Dasein can question and examine its own Being. This examination does not take place in 
a subject/object dualism but is prior to any such distinctions; Dasein must view itself as a subject 
in and amongst other subjects. Analysis of Being cannot take place from an abstracted point of 
view or by using categorical terms applied to objects. 
  Thiselton identifies three ways in which Heidegger is fundamentally hermeneutical in 
his approach. The first, is his reliance on pre-understanding to begin an exposition of Dasein. 
The second, is Heidegger’s use of the phrase “horizon for understanding”; “Everything, in 
Heidegger’s view, is seen and understood from within a particular horizon. Meaning is that from 
which something is understandable as the thing it is.”95 Third, Heidegger is hermeneutic in his 
desire to recover a mode of thinking that has been lost to time. “Temporal distance must be 
 
93 Thiselton finds here, in Being and Time, a parallel with Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle and pre-understanding as a 
starting point for human inquiry. 
94 Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, 1980, 147. 
95 Thiselton, 149. 
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overcome so that these genuinely creative minds may speak anew to Heidegger’s own 
question.”96 
The connection between Heidegger’s conception of Dasein and its relationship to 
Augustine may be closer than his explicit citation. Of course, Augustine is mentioned several 
times in Being and Time, particularly in his classic exposition of time from Confessions XI. 
Heidegger also explicitly uses Augustine’s reflection on the self (Confessions X) as a direct 
counterpoint for Descartes’ cogito.97 The blame for philosophy’s loss of Being falls squarely on 
Descartes; “to whom one attributes the discovery of the cogito sum as the point of departure for 
all modern philosophical questioning. He investigates the cogitare of the ego—within limits. But 
the sum he leaves completely undiscussed, even though it is just as primordial as the cogito.”98 
Heidegger was drawn to Augustinian ontology early in his career. “There is a limited 
generic similarity between Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit and Saint Augustine’s Soliloquies,” but 
distinctions were “not at all evident in Heidegger’s 1924 lecture, “Der Begriff der Zeit”, which 
was a precursor to Sein und Zeit.”99 It must be of significance that within pages of beginning his 
work (after two lengthy introductions) Heidegger quotes Augustine as an example of examining 
Dasein in its “everydayness”.100 In his earlier career, Heidegger was openly Augustinian in 
 
96 Thiselton, 151. 
97 Heidegger, Being and Time, 43–45. 
98 Heidegger, 45. 
99 Edward Booth, “Heidegger and Saint Augustine on Time,” New Blackfriars 85, no. 998 (2004): 399. 
100 Heidegger, Being and Time, 43. 
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personal correspondence and lectures, but by 1927 Being and Time had become divested of overt 
theological references.101 A compelling argument has been advanced that Dasein shares more 
than surface level terminology, but is in fact, a secularized version of Augustine’s theology of 
love.102  Coyne quotes Heidegger, “Dasein is a self-interpreting, self-articulating entity. It was 
seven years ago, while I was investigating these structures in conjunction with my attempts to 
arrive at the ontological foundations of Augustinian anthropology, that I first came across the 
phenomenon of care.”103  
This possible reliance on Augustine aside, “The critique of Cartesian subjectivity and the 
retrieval of Augustinian thought were initially linked for Heidegger.”104 It is worth noting the 
irony here. The existentialists and deconstructionists that claim roots in various aspects of 
Heidegger’s work, sever the connection between ontology and language on the basis of dualisms 
in western philosophy. They attribute these dualisms to the lineage of Plato, Aristotle, and 
Augustine. Heidegger himself relied on Augustine to overcome the dualism of Descartes, whose 
cogito is the entity to which existentialists and deconstructionists claim external Being cannot be 
justified.  
 
101 See also, Ryan Coyne, Heidegger’s Confessions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
102 Lars Östman, “Love and Grace in Heidegger’s Sein Und Zeit,” Sophia 53, no. 4 (December 2014): 535–51, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-013-0389-6. 
103 Heidegger, as quoted by Ryan Coyne, “A Difficult Proximity: The Figure of Augustine in Heidegger’s Path,” 
Journal of Religion 91, no. 3 (July 2011): 366. 
104 Coyne, 369. 
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Gadamer’s Horizons and Possibilities 
After establishing access to Being through Heidegger’s Dasein, Thiselton needs to connect to a 
clearly hermeneutical framework. To do this, he relies on the hermeneutic epistemology of Hans-
Georg Gadamer. First, because there are some points of connection between Gadamer and 
Heidegger, but “he is also more systematic and less elusive that the later thought of 
Heidegger.”105 Second, Thiselton is drawn to Gadamer’s descriptive, rather than theoretical 
approach to the truth. Third, Gadamer is dismissive of methodological conceptions of knowledge 
and prefers to explore “modes of experience (Erfahrungsweisen) in which a truth is 
communicated.”106 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer identifies the post-enlightenment (particularly following 
Kant and Hume) shift from ‘science’ meaning ‘reason’, to the modern view that “‘science’ has 
meant to us not so much Reason as empirical science.”107 This shift has been to the detriment of 
practical knowledge or wisdom. He argues that for the Greeks, practical wisdom (phronesis) was 
assumed as a prerequisite for theoretical wisdom (sophia), and the two together formed ‘common 
norms.’ This was the Roman concept of Sensus Communis, which Italian philosopher Vico108 
identified as the “sense of the right and the general good… that is acquired through living in the 
 
105 Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, 1980, 293. 
106 Gadamer, as quoted by Thiselton, 293. 
107 Gadamer, as quoted by Thiselton, 294. 
108 Giambattista Vico, 1668-1744.  
40 
 
community and is determined by its structures and aims. … It was always known that the 
possibilities of rational proof and instruction did not fully exhaust the sphere of knowledge.”109 
For Gadamer and Thiselton, this expanded view of knowledge becomes a cornerstone for 
the hermeneutic endeavor. It relates to hermeneutics first, in that “truth is not to be reduced to a 
mere matter of concepts but relates to experience in broader terms.”110 Second, it brings up 
questions about interpretation. Gadamer introduces interpretation through examining 
understanding in art and music before shifting to textual interpretation; in part, to establish that 
hermeneutics is an art and not a mechanical process,111 as well as to show that interpretation is 
performative.  
A picture, [Gadamer] claims, is an ontological event in which truth is disclosed in 
the present. Even in the case of reading literature, ‘in its deciphering and 
interpretation a miracle takes place: the transformation of something strange and 
dead into a total simultaneity and familiarity. This is like nothing else that has 
come down to us from the past.’ It achieves ‘the sheer presence of the past.’ 
Being, or truth, is disclosed to us, however, only when we allow ourselves to 
stand in the world created by the literature or other art-form.112  
This performative nature of hermeneutics opens two fundamental aspects of Thiselton’s 
interpretive framework; the horizons, and pre-understanding. The ‘two horizons’ of Thiselton 
 
109 Gadamer on Vicco, as quoted by Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 295. 
110 Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, 1980, 298. 
111 This emphasis is a significant theme for Thiselton, cf Two Horizons, 301; and Intro to Hermeneutics, 2. 
112 Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, 1980, 299. 
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come from Husserl; and was adopted by both Heidegger and Gadamer; the metaphor of the ‘two 
horizons’ became the hallmark of Thiselton’s career. 
The phenomenon of horizon is of crucial importance for Husserl’s 
phenomenological research. This concept, we too shall have occasion to use. … A 
horizon is not a rigid frontier, but something that moves with one and invites one 
to advance further.113  
 The second dimension of the horizon is what Thiselton calls pre-understanding. 
Heidegger referred to this aspect of the hermeneutic circle as “fore-having”, “fore-sight”, and 
“fore-conceptions” (Vorhabe, Vorsicht, and Vorgriff). Gadamer, for the most part, accepts this, 
but emphasizes the “correction and revision of preliminary understanding.”114 Gadamer attempts 
to strike a balance between commitments to the impossibility of ‘presuppositionless’ 
interpretation, and allowing the text to ‘speak what is new.’ To achieve this, an interpreter must 
maintain two attitudes; first, to remain open to the meaning of the text, and second, to 
continuously expose the pre-understandings one has when approaching the text.  
 Gadamer, and Thiselton, must develop a conception of pre-understanding that navigates 
between the “naïve objectivism” of post-enlightenment empiricism, and the negative view of 
‘prejudice’ held by later literary criticism and deconstruction. Of significant influence on pre-
understanding is tradition and authority, but this must be brought out from under the dogmatic 
shadow of modern rejection. “The acceptance of authority, [Gadamer] argues, is not necessarily 
 
113 Gadamer, as quoted by Thiselton, 303 (ellipses Thiselton’s). 
114 Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 304. 
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blind or irrational obedience. It may be based on the thoroughly rational insight that …I have my 
own built-in limitations,”115 Tradition is not something that overshadows an interpreter’s own 
subjective thought, but rather “is the horizon within which we do our thinking.”116 For Gadamer, 
as with Heidegger, our own locatedness, (thrownness, facticity, etc from Being and Time) is what 
allows and enables an interpreter to begin the process of understanding at all. This is the point of 
entry to the hermeneutical circle for interpreting Being (Heidegger) as well as an artwork or text 
(Gadamer). As such, tradition is not a negative factor at all, it is simply one that must be 
critically engaged.  
 The crucial aspect of this hermeneutical circle is that the interpreter does not remain in 
their own pre-understanding, but allows the text to speak, to stretch the horizons of 
understanding in new directions, and allows for the text to change the interpreter. This approach 
to text as subject has been exemplified by Augustine. In Confessions, Augustine makes a pointed 
effort to show that engagement with a text was the impetus for each significant change in his life, 
leading to his conversion. Cynthia Nielsen follows his literary path from Cicero’s Hortensius, to 
Ambrose’s rhetoric, to Platonist writings, and to St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans.117 Augustine 
shows that he was affected by his encounter with these texts in a way that was a catalyst for 
personal change and growth. 
 
115 Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description, 1980, 305. 
116 Thiselton, 306. 
117 Cynthia R. Nielsen, “St. Augustine on Text and Reality (and a Little Gadamerian Spice),” Heythrop Journal 50, 
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 Gadamer himself states that Augustine looms large in his thinking about language, its 
possibilities, and its limitations. In an interview with Jean Grondin, Gadamer discussed the 
paradox of the infinite possibilities and limits of language and how it relates to ontology.  
Gadamer: Hermeneutics helps us to realize that there is always much that remains 
unsaid when one says something. There is a lot in the same direction of meaning 
that almost completely escapes our attention because of the abstraction contained 
in concepts of modern science.  
 
Grondin: If I understand you correctly, you are emphasizing with this assertion 
the limits of language, while one gets the impression from Truth and Method that 
the universe of language is boundless. 118   
 
Gadamer: No, no! I have never thought and never ever said that everything is 
language. Being that can be understood, in so far as it can be understood, is 
language. This contains a limitation. What cannot be understood can pose an 
endless task of at least finding a word that comes a little closer to the matter [die 
Sache].  
 
Grondin: Why [in Truth and Method] do you invoke St Augustine’s doctrine of 
the inner word in this connection?  
 
Gadamer: Precisely because it took Augustine no less than 15 books to get closer 
to the secret of the Trinity without falling into the false way out of Gnostic 
presumption. … 119 
 
 Gadamer finds, in De Trinitate, an exploration of the incredible possibility of language to 
signify, explore, and understand Being. There is also a recognition that language is not the 
 
118 There has been significant debate about Gadamer’s concept of the universality of language and how he uses 
Augustine to advance his proposal, Grondin’s, own understanding of this topic has been challenged. See, David 
Vessey, “Gadamer, Augustine, Aquinas, and Hermeneutic Universality,” Philosophy Today 55, no. 2 (May 2011): 
158–65. 
119 Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jean Grondin, “Looking Back with Gadamer Over His Writings and Their Effective 
History: A Dialogue with Jean Grondin (1996),” Theory, Culture & Society 23, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 92, 
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master of Being, and as such has its limits. “It is the Augustinian doctrine with all possible 
emphasis, that the trinitas exactly means the boundary. In this case, we can only come closer to 
[understanding] through human analogies.”120 By use of analogies, Gadamer finds that 
Augustine carefully works to make his audience ‘familiar’ with the concept of the Trinitarian 
God, and at least shape it into a rough silhouette; but also, to show the limitations to the project. 
“Augustine presented 15 analogies to the mystery of the Trinity – precisely to show that not 
everything is governable by humans.”121  
This distinction between ontology and language is critical to the possibility of language 
to communicate. The move to collapse this difference is where the New Hermeneutic, New 
Criticism, and deconstruction unravel the ability of language to mean anything.  In addition, 
because Being exists prior to and outside of language, language cannot in and of itself ‘govern’ 
or ‘dominate’ Being.122 
 Thiselton, through Heidegger and Gadamer, establishes a framework in which Being is 
separated from both the cogito as subject, and a deterministic conception of language. He does 
not, however, systematically develop a theory of language itself. Instead, he takes a pragmatic 
approach and identifies what language does through the speech-act theory of J.L. Austin and 
 
120 Gadamer and Grondin, 92. 
121 Gadamer and Grondin, 93. 
122 This limitation on language counters Michel Foucault, language itself cannot ‘dominate’ being; beings, however 
can use language to dominate other beings.  
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John R. Searle. The importance of speech-act theory increased as Thiselton’s career went on.123 
Tradition has also taken significant prominence for hermeneutics, significant enough for 
Thiselton that he finds that it warrants hermeneutic treatment itself.124 He remained, however, 
reluctant to place much stock in the referring function of language for determining meaning. 
Thiselton puts little faith in the word-referent dynamic, instead he prefers the ‘openness 
of hermeneutics’ of Ricoeur, because it takes us to “the place where language comes to itself, the 
place where language is saying.”125 This openness, however, needs to be tempered with 
“distancing and critical objectivity”.126 Semantic/linguistic discipline “achieves a more rigorous 
‘scientific’ objectivity”127 but at the expense of limiting possible symbolic meaning in language. 
He needs to balance between being open to possible symbolic interpretation, but also incorporate 
some level of semantic horizon.   
Thiselton could have explored a robust theory of reference, but he does not pursue this 
avenue. He adopts instead, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s argument that a theory of reference cannot be 
a theory of meaning. He cites two reasons: first, Wittgenstein finds that reference is still tied to 
communication. The difficulty is that there can be many attributes referenced by one indication. 
 
123 Speech-act theory is mentioned three times in Two Horizons, in New Horizons a whole chapter, plus many 
citations of Searle and Austin, and near ubiquitous reference in Thiselton on Hermeneutics. 
124 Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine. 
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“Point to a piece of paper- and now point to its shape- now to its color- now to its number. 
…How do you do it?”128 It is on this point that Thiselton makes his only direct quote from 
Augustine in relation to a theory of language.  From Confessions; “I gradually identified the 
objects which the words stood for … I exchanged with those about me the verbal signs by which 
we express our wishes…”129 Thiselton seems to understand this direct referentiality to be the 
sum of Augustine’s theory, and placed within the assumed allegorical tradition, concludes that 
“there is no effective check on the relations between the different semiotic systems.”130 
Wittgenstein’s second problem with referentiality is that for certain types of words, the 
ostensive definition cannot be made clear simply by pointing out a referent. Most nouns can be 
learned simply by pointing to an object (like the pencil) and saying “pencil”. For signs indicating 
certain actions and properties it can be more difficult to establish the ostensive meaning.  
Augustine Word and Referent 
Augustine, however, does take both objections into consideration in the development of his 
theory of word and reference. In On the Teacher (De magistro),131 he delves into these difficult 
issues of words and referentiality at length. This dialogue took place in 389 CE between 
Augustine and his son, Adeodatus, who at the time was sixteen; (he later died as Augustine 
 
128 Wittgenstein, as quoted by Thiselton, 123. 
129 Augustine, Confessions I.8.13. as quoted by Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice 
of Transforming Biblical Reading, 192f. 
130 Thiselton, 193. 
131 Augustine of Hippo, Against the Academicians and The Teacher. Hereafter, Mag. 
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writes in Confessions).132 Augustine began with the question, “What do we do when we speak?” 
After some discussion, it is concluded that people speak in order to teach. Even in asking a 
question we are simply teaching another what knowledge we desire.133 For other uses of speech, 
such as singing or talking to oneself, the speaker is ‘reminding’ him/herself, which is a form of 
teaching.   
Next, Augustine defines ‘word’. A word is an utterance that is a sign for something else; 
without a referent, an utterance is simply a noise. It is not, however, always obvious what that 
referent is. He discusses the referent of the word ‘nothing’, which literally cannot have a physical 
referent. The conclusion is that the utterance ‘nothing’ must have a significate because a 
meaning is understood when a hearer receives it; that referent must be a “state of mind rather 
than the very thing that is [nothing].”134  
Other words, such as the preposition ‘from’ are problematic as well. They can only be 
indicated by other words such as ‘out of’ or ‘separation’, and not by pointing to an external 
object. Even physical attributes such as color, cannot simply be indicated by pointing at an 
object. Augustine, as we can see, acknowledges the issues that later Wittgenstein and Thiselton 
have with a reference theory, as well as problems they do not consider. Verbs can also be 
 
132 Augustine of Hippo, 94 King’s footnote 1. 
133 For Augustine, prayer is problematic for this conclusion for a person praying cannot ‘teach’ God. Augustine 
(somewhat allegorically) defines prayer as a wordless spiritual communication interior to the heart. 
134 Mag. 2.3.41. 
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difficult to indicate; for if someone were to ask, “What is ‘walking’?” while walking, how can a 
teacher indicate what they are currently doing? 
Even in the case of an object as referent, pointing to the object is a sign itself. Pointing is 
not the object; it is a placeholder, indicating and drawing the attention of another person to an 
external object. Augustine considers the fact that people who are deaf, as well as theatrical 
pantomimes, communicate meaning using only physical gestures, without the use of words at all. 
Thus, all signs rely on other signs. “I see nothing, therefore, that can be shown without signs.”135  
Augustine identifies the following categories of signs, divided by how knowledge of their 
significate is formed: 
1. Signs that, when asked can be exhibited only by other signs. 
a. This includes physical objects that can be pointed to, (which are not discussed 
in this dialogue). 
b. Words that can only be indicated by other words. 
2. Self-exhibiting significates, that can be shown without signs. 
a. “Things we aren’t doing when we are asked and yet can do on the spot”.136 
 
135 Mag. 3.6.52. 
136 Mag. 4.7.4. 
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b. “Signs we happen to be doing, just as when we speak we are making signs, 
‘signifying’ is derived from this.”137 
This categorization is both semantic/linguistic and epistemological. “On the one hand, we 
might ask what conditions have to be satisfied for us to have knowledge of significates that are 
themselves signs. This is Division 1 [above]. On the other hand, we might be concerned with 
knowledge of significates that are non-signs. This is Division 2.”138 For Augustine, the 
relationship between sign and signified is the crucial relationship in analyzing language, as will 
be shown. He carefully distinguishes between what is a sign, what is a referent, and how one can 
know one from the other. 
The first task is to separate word (as sign) from the signified object. This ontological 
distinction is clear, a word is a sign that simply indicates the object. It is no more the object itself 
than a finger pointing to the object. A word is an utterance that indicates something. A name is a 
type of word that indicates an object (i.e. Rome, Romulus, river, virtue). The named object can 
be a visible thing, (river), or it can be an ‘intelligible’ thing (virtue). 139  Adeodatus (Augustine’s 
son and interlocutor) notes that there are other types of words that do not directly name an object, 
 
137 Mag. 4.7.4-7. 
138 Augustine of Hippo, Against the Academicians and The Teacher, 103 footnote 19. 
139 Mag. 4.8. 
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either physical or intelligible (i.e. the conjunction ‘if’). This complication is set aside 
temporarily. 140 
There are two components of a word, first is the sensory aspect. This includes the sound 
of the utterance as that which “strikes the ear so that it can be perceived”. The second, the 
cognitive aspect, is that which “is committed to memory so that it can be known.”141 These two 
aspects relate to the terms word and name previously identified. “What if words are so called 
because of one of these and names are so called because of the other – ‘words’ [verba] from 
striking [the ear (verbarando)] and ‘names’ [nomina] from knowing [noscendo].142  
The goal for the next section of the dialogue is to show that every word has the property 
of a name, in that it has a referent that can be known. Augustine begins with pronouns; they 
obviously name things, they simply do so in a generic way, as they are used as substitutes for 
specific names.  
Augustine next presents an argument that conjunctions also ‘name’ which Adeodatus 
finds rather unconvincing. Augustine does not respond to his criticism but oddly moves on. His 
next argument is based on a statement from the apostle Paul, “In Christ there was not Yea and 
Nay, but in Him was Yea.”143 It would not be said that the three letters y-e-a were in Christ, but 
 
140 Mag. 4.9.105-109. 
141 Mag. 5.12.48-49. 
142 Mag. 5.12.54-57, also King, footnote 31, 110. 
143 II Corinthians 1.19. 
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that which is called ‘Yea’. If Paul had written “in Him was virtue”, we would not “think that 
these two syllables we enunciate when we say ‘vir-tue’ were in Him rather than what is signified 
by these two syllables.”144 In Paul’s statement, ‘Yea’ names something, just as any other name in 
its place would; and yet, Yea (Latin, est, or ‘it is so’) is a verb.  
Augustine continues his argument by illustration of translation from another language. He 
lists examples of seven parts of speech (eight parts of speech, minus nouns) and their Greek 
equivalents. “What do the Greeks name what we name ‘who?’...” “Yet in all these parts of 
speech I have just listed, it can’t be that anyone who asks what they are in this way would speak 
correctly unless they were names.”145 Furthermore, Cicero, the “paradigm … of Latin rhetorical 
and philosophical prose,”146 himself, called the preposition coram (‘in the presence of’), a 
‘name’. 
Augustine’s final proof in this line of reasoning involves a discussion of whether the conjunction 
‘if’ is more appropriate than ‘because’ in a statement. The discussion determines that “’if’ is 
acceptable” and “’because’ is unacceptable.”147 Both of these statements are appropriately 
propositions, and in order to construct a proposition one requires both a subject (or ‘name’), and 
a verb. In these propositions, ‘is’ is the verb, ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ are adjectives. This 
 
144 Mag. 5.14.111-14. 
145 Mag. 5.15.165-68. 
146 Augustine of Hippo, Against the Academicians and The Teacher, 115 see footnote 42. 
147 Mag. 5.16 
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requires that ‘if’ and ‘because’ are the subjects of these propositions.148 If they can be a subject 
they must entail a property that ‘is’ something. In conclusion to these four proofs Augustine 
states “as we have found that all words are names and that all names are words.”149  
Briefly discussed is the category of words that signify themselves as well as others. The 
word ‘name’ refers to ‘things that name’, as well as itself, because it names something. 
(‘Conjunction’ does not, for it names conjunctions but is not one itself.)  Augustine also 
mentions a category of words that signify the same thing and differ only in ‘sound’. This 
category includes synonyms, but also, equivalents between languages are noted as an example of 
this group. This section ends with Adeodatus giving a review of the argumentation covering 
Division 1 (above).   
In the next section of the dialogue, the interlocutors take up defining signs that do not 
refer to other signs but instead refer to other things. Again, a careful and deliberate division is 
made between the sign and the signified, with an emphasis on the impression that each makes on 
the mind. Adeodatus states after some exasperating wordplay by Augustine, “Look, now I take 
the whole thing only from the standpoint of what is signified. I do agree with you that we can’t 
carry on a conversation at all unless the words we hear direct the mind to the things of which 
they are the sign.”150 
 
148 Mag. 5.16. 
149 Mag. 6.17.2. 
150 Mag. 8.22.71-74. 
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First, it is established that a word is only a word because it refers to something. If an 
utterance (or even an individual syllable of a known word) is used without a significate, it is not 
a word. Second, the word is not the object it signifies; when a speaker utters the sign, the 
signified is only ‘pointed to’.  As the hearer “I can’t help thinking that what is signified by the 
syllable is relevant to the conclusion, by virtue of the law [of reason] that naturally has the most 
power—so that once the signs are heard the attention is directed to the things signified.”151 
At this juncture, Augustine exposits what King refers to as Augustine’s Rule.152 The 
significate has more value than the sign. “I want you to understand that the things signified 
should be valued mare than their signs. Whatever exists on account of another must be worth less 
than that on account of which it exists.”153 Value is placed on that with ontological priority, if the 
sign exists only because of the object it refers to, it must therefore be less valuable.  
This sign/significate distinction and its ontic/epistemological dimension produce four 
divisions of the semantic relationship: 
1. The sign 
2. The thing 
3. Knowledge of the sign 
 
151 Mag. 9.24.148-51. 
152 Augustine of Hippo, Against the Academicians and The Teacher, 127 footnote 57. 
153 Mag. 9.25.1-4. (Emphasis by translator) 
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4. Knowledge of the thing154 
In this division, because of the ontic priority of the significate, knowledge of the sign is 
not possible without knowledge of the thing it refers to. With this priority in mind, Augustine 
recalls, and then negates, the earlier conclusion that nothing can be taught without signs. For, if 
knowledge of the referent is essential to knowledge, it is preferable to learn via the thing itself 
without signs.155 Certain actions fall into this category; walking, and bird-catching are the 
examples that are given. Someone could learn these tasks/things by observing another do them, 
without indicating language at all.  
Knowledge of some things can be achieved before knowledge of their sign. One can 
know what a head is before they are aware of the sign ‘head’. Since knowledge of things is 
possible without signs, teaching and signifying are two different things; we signify to teach, we 
do not teach to signify. Words call our attention to something, like pointing a finger. They do not 
actually display things for a hearer/reader to ‘know’. Augustine now reverses the conclusion, as 
previously agreed, that we speak to teach. “When words are spoken we either know what they 
signify, or we don’t; if we know, then it’s reminding rather than learning; but if we don’t know, 
it isn’t even reminding, though perhaps we recollect that we should inquire.”156  
 
154 Mag. 9.27. 
155 There is an exception made; moral objects, such as vice, modify the preference. The name is preferable to 
possession of vice itself, but knowledge of the vice is still more important than knowledge of the sign ‘vice’.  
156 Mag. 11.36.15-18. 
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By way of explanation, Augustine references the story of the three men thrown into the 
furnace (Daniel 3).  
… everything signified by those words was already known to us. I’m already 
familiar with what three boys are, what a furnace is, what fire is, what a king is, 
and finally what being unharmed by fire is, and all the other things that those 
words signify. Yet Ananias, Azarias, and Misahel are just as unknown to me as 
the sarabarae,157 and these names didn’t help me at all to know them, nor could 
they help me.158  
 In this final section (10.33-13.46) of The Teacher, Adeodatus does not speak at all. 
Augustine instead adopts the tone of a lecture, and exposits the relationship between sign, 
signified, semantics, and knowledge. His epistemological framework will be discussed along 
with Against the Academicians. For now, a summary of Augustine’s function of signification is 
appropriate. 
1. Words are signs, though they are not the only signs, there are non-utterance signs (i.e. 
pointing a finger). Any utterance that is not used as a sign, is not a word. 
2. Humans use signs to teach or to remind (this is a provisional argument). 
3. Every word ‘names’ something in that it has a referent, whether it is ‘corporeal’ or 
‘intelligible’.    
4. Some words point to physical objects or attributes, these can be indicated by pointing a 
finger. 
 
157 Sarabarae; Latin: loose wide trousers worn in the East; Oxford Latin Dictionary. Augustine uses this word 
throughout Mag. as an example of a word he had no knowledge as to its referent. 
158 Mag. 11.37.25-31. 
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5. Some things (i.e. some actions) themselves can be shown without a sign.  
6. Some words only indicate other words. 
7. Signs are not what they signify but depend on the signified for their existence. 
8. A sign is only understood when the signified is known. 
Thiselton correctly insists that Being and language must be distinct to avoid the relativism of 
demythologizing in Bultmann and the New Hermeneutic. His use of Heidegger and Gadamer 
show that language and Being are separate ontologically, and the subject/object dichotomy can 
be overcome. He does not ever directly address how language works in relation to Being.  His 
use of speech-act theory is helpful in showing why we use language, but he never elaborates on 
how language works. Augustine, by developing a robust theory of reference, allows language to 
indicate an external object, be it concrete or cognitive. In this Augustine overcomes 
Wittgenstein’s objections to a simplistic theory of reference. By referring to something, words 
have a finite potential meaning which restricts possible interpretations. This exteriority also 
directly counters a deconstructionist nihilism. Language is not simply a never-ending series of 
symbols, but a symbol whose meaning is found in something outside the conventional system.  
Having established that the location of meaning is in reference, Augustine is not content to 
let the matter rest. He then begins an analysis of the limit of reference, specifically, that 
understanding of an unknown res cannot be achieved simply by use of a sign. The referent must 
be made available in some way to constitute knowledge. Here, the problem of semantics relates 
to the problem of epistemology. There must be some Criterion on which the relationship between 
sign and referent must rely. In the last section of Mag. Augustine abruptly finds that Christ as 
logos, is required to hold the system together.   
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Regarding each of the things we understand, however, we don’t consult a speaker 
who makes sounds outside of us, but the Truth that presides within over the mind 
itself, though perhaps words prompt us to consult Him. What is more, He Who is 
consulted, He Who is said to dwell in the inner man,159 does teach: Christ.160 
 
 Using only signs, one person may not ‘teach’ another, but only ‘remind’ them of 
references of which they already possess knowledge.161 Only the Teacher, as both Word and 
Creator, can make fully known: “He Who prompts us externally through men by means of signs, 
so that we are instructed to be inwardly turned toward Him. To know and love Him is the happy 
life which all proclaim they seek.”162  
 
159 Ephesians 3.16-17. 
160 Mag. 10.38.44-48. 
161 Mag. 10.34. 
162 Mag. 13.46.23-26, see discussions of happiness also in, C. Acad. I.2.5 and De beata vita (On the Happy Life). 
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3. Possibility of Knowledge for Hermeneutics 
It has been shown that, for Augustine, words must point to something; furthermore, that 
‘something’ must be understood for the word to mean anything. For Augustine, the practice of 
interpreting meaning in communication begins with things. While the stated purpose of On 
Christian Teaching is to explicate “the mode of ascertaining the proper meaning, …and making 
known the meaning when it is ascertained”,163  the bulk of Book I is largely devoted to ‘things’. 
In Chapter 2, Augustine divides ‘things’ in two categories. First, as general term “… a thing is 
whatever is sensed or is understood or is hidden.”164 “In De dialectica a res …is said to be 
whatever is the object of understanding or sense perception or even of ignorance.”165 Any ‘thing’ 
that has Being is a res; the grammatical definition of ‘noun’ as person, place, thing, or idea may 
be a helpful understanding of res.  
It may seem, at least on a practical level, to be obvious that language needs a predicate as 
its basis. It is, after all, generally assumed to be a system to communicate ‘something about 
 
163 Doc. chr.  I.1.1. 
164 De dialectica V. Augustine of Hippo, De dialectica, trans. B. Darrell Jackson (Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 
1975). 
165 B. Darrell Jackson, “The Theory of Signs in St. Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana,” 1967, 18. 
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something’. Access to the res, as ‘something’ has not, however, fared so well throughout the 
course of post-enlightenment thought.   
Modern Skepticism 
Out of the Meditations of Descartes, a new brand of skeptic was born. No longer was existence 
Platonically divided between a superior bodiless soul and an inferior material world, but between 
an interior mind and an unverifiable external world. The early modern philosophers placed the 
cogito as the new center of existence—all other entities must prove that they can prove 
themselves. There is even debate amongst scholars as to the interpretation of Descartes’ 
delineation between objects themselves.166 For Augustine, intellecta was the mind 
comprehending the exterior; for the moderns, the mind is the sole ontological judge of all other 
entities. 
Whether a modern thinker believed in the ‘real world’ was not the issue, the challenge 
was to establish how an object can present itself to the mind of the thinking subject.  For writers 
such as George Berkeley, the mind was all that mattered ontologically.  There was no necessity 
for the res to persist beyond the mind. There simply was no self-evident rationale for an object 
existing (or at least persisting) without a mind to perceive it. The thinking “I” became, in effect, 
the new center of the universe.   
 
166 cf Edward Slowik, “Descartes and Individual Corporeal Substance,” British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy 9, no. 1 (March 2001): 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/09608780010012666. 
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It has been a subject of debate whether the Idealists were true Skeptics; Berkley himself 
denied that he was a skeptic in an often-quoted passage from Three Dialogues between Hylas 
and Philonous about a cherry.  
I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure nothing cannot be seen, or felt, 
or tasted: it is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, 
redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry. Since it is not a being distinct 
from sensation; a cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, 
or ideas perceived by different senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or 
have one name given them) by the mind; because they are observed to attend 
together.167 
 Berkeley insists that the cherry is real and appeals to the ‘common sense’ of it. For, 
“Berkeley himself maintained that his approach to an understanding of the natural world and our 
knowledge of it was less skeptical and closer to common sense than any prevailing philosophical 
theory.”168 The ‘realness’ of the cherry is in its “congeries of sensible impressions”, the senses 
detect color, taste and texture; the mind collects these impressions and identifies them as 
consistent with the idea of a cherry. That certainly appeals to the common sense experience of an 
object.  
Berkeley includes an important qualification in that the cherry is not distinct from its 
sensation. The existence of the cherry is in the perception of the cherry. Furthermore, as he says 
through Philonous, “Whatever is immediately perceived is an idea; and can any idea exist out of 
 
167Berkeley as quoted by; Margaret Atherton, “‘The Books Are in the Study as before’: Berkeley’s Claims about 
Real Physical Objects,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16, no. 1 (February 2008): 86, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09608780701789301. (Italics added). 
168 Margaret Atherton, “‘The Books Are in the Study as before’: Berkeley’s Claims about Real Physical Objects,” 
(February 2008): 85. 
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the mind?”169 By implication, the human subject as cogito, is the sole master, of not only its own 
experience, but also its own existence in a network of dependent exterior objects.  
This is not simply a pedantic epistemological distinction, as Berkeley and his idealist 
colleagues introduce an unknown number of unverifiable obstacles into the relationship between 
the perceiving mind and the exterior world. Further, by placing ontics in the realm of the mental, 
there is little to be done in the way of refuting the conception.  
An empiricist approaches the problem from a different perspective. John Locke rejects 
the concept of innate ideas; this has become the core of much of modern thought.  Bertrand 
Russell points out that “in [Locke’s] day the mind was supposed to know all sorts of things a 
priori, and the complete dependence of knowledge upon perception, which he proclaimed, was a 
new and revolutionary doctrine.”170  For Locke, the mind is a tabula rasa, all knowledge is 
developed through experience. A perceiving mind experiences sensory inputs which it compiles 
into a representation of a material object.  The object directly causes these sensations, which 
should overcome the idealist conundrum, as the object is once again master of its own ontic 
properties. A new problem arises for Locke however; “Since the mind, in all its thoughts and 
reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can 
contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them.”171  
 
169 Berkeley, as quoted by Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Touchstone, 2007), 651. 
170 Russell, 610. 
171 Locke, as quoted by Russell, 611. 
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The empiricist allows that an object exists apart from a perceiving mind; but the 
perceiving mind only has knowledge of its own ideas as perceptions of the sensory 
representation of the object. At best, assuming the mind’s ideas are an accurate understanding of 
the sensible properties of the object, the representation is all we can know. The object itself is 
still beyond our grasp. St. Augustine’s res, as the basis for hermeneutics, does not fare too well 
in the epistemology of the enlightenment, though philosophical hermeneutics as a discipline have 
been a counterpoint to modernist epistemology. 
In brief, hermeneutic philosophy is an approach to questions of truth and 
knowledge that focuses on the recovery for the present of the experience of the 
past as expressed in various cultural forms. Moreover, it understands this focus as 
at least a supplement and, more commonly, an embrasive alternative to the 
ahistorical empirical focus of classical epistemology.172 
As the field of hermeneutics has gained importance in the wider philosophical discussion, 
its influence has deeply impacted theological disciplines as well. Where systematic theologians 
once began their schemas with an exposition of their epistemological stance, (as doctrines of 
Revelation or Word of God) they must now address the hermeneutical framework from which 
their system is developed. As Gerhard Ebeling, a systematician from the mid-twentieth century 
wrote, “Hermeneutics now takes the place of the classical epistemological theory.... For theology 
the hermeneutic problem is therefore today becoming the place of meeting with philosophy.”173   
 
172 Randy L. Maddox, “Contemporary Hermeneutic Philosophy and Theological Studies,” Religious Studies 21, no. 
04 (December 1985): 518, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500017728. (Italics original) 
173 Gerhard Ebeling, as quoted by Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical 
Description, 1980, 4. 
63 
 
The enlightenment, however, was not the originator of skeptical frameworks. 
Epistemological skeptics have been influential since before humanity began to systematically 
treat the subject. Arguments have been made that skeptical views were present in Homer’s epics 
and were later treated by early Greek philosophers.174 By late antiquity, skepticism had a firm 
grasp on Plato’s Academy, with some adopting the more radical teachings of Pyrrho (365/60-
275/70). It is in Pyrrho that we also find the clearest example of the ramifications of a skeptical 
doctrine on hermeneutics.   
 “The Sceptic is never supposed to state a decided opinion, but only to say what appears 
to him. Even the Sceptical formulae, such as "Nothing more," or "I decide nothing," or "All is 
false," include themselves with other things. The only statements that the Sceptic can make, are 
in regard to his own sensations.”175 When a skeptic embraces the limitation of knowledge, 
speechlessness (aphasia) will follow, for any statement other than to simply acknowledge 
perceived sense-data is indeterminate and meaningless. In consequence of skepticism, the 
referent of language becomes inaccessible, and words are indeterminate utterances in the white 
noise of sense-perceptions. 
 
174 cf Michelle Zerba, “What Penelope Knew: Doubt and Scepticism in the Odyssey,” Classical Quarterly;59, no. 2 
(December 2009): 295–316, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.mdx.ac.uk/10.1017/S0009838809990012. 
175 Mary Mills Patrick, “Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism,” 25, accessed July 15, 2018, 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17556/17556-h/17556-h.htm#CHAPTER_II. 
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Augustine’s Skeptical Context 
Before addressing Augustine’s challenge to skepticism, a brief overview of the development of 
skepticism in antiquity is helpful. Any discussion of this topic should follow its development 
between the Stoics and Plato’s Academy. It is important to note that for both schools, and 
Greek/Hellenistic philosophy in general, philosophy was not an isolated discipline. It was a 
holistic part of being a good person and citizen.  Philosophy was an active pursuit, seeking 
wisdom, personal happiness, and a just polis. For many strains of Hellenistic thought, a key ideal 
was happiness in ataraxia – freedom from strife. To achieve ataraxia, one must come to right 
knowledge… or at minimum avoid error.  
Zeno,176 founder of the Stoic school, proposed that within the process of belief-formation 
there is an inherent norm for believing truths. Certain beliefs are representations of actuality, and 
these true beliefs impress themselves on the mind in ways that falsities do not, these are called 
cognitive impressions.177 Not all impressions are cognitive, but all cognitive impressions must be 
true.  
In response, Arcesilaus178 led the Academy in Athens to reject the possibility of any 
knowledge. In this rejection of the positive doctrine of Plato, Arcesilaus began what has 
 
176 Zeno of Citium (ca. 344-262 BCE). 
177 Phantasia kataleptike. 
178 Ca. 316-241 BCE. 
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variously been referred to as the “New,” “Second,” or “Middle” Academy.179 He argued that 
some impressions will misrepresent what is actual, humans have no fail-proof method to 
distinguish between a false impression and a ‘cognitive impression.’ Without a Criterion of 
Truth,180 reason requires that we suspend all judgments about beliefs.  
At this time, ‘skeptic’ was not a term used for those who held this view; skepsis is Greek 
for ‘investigation’. The members of the Academy, and others that thought along these lines, saw 
themselves as continually investigating the world around them.  Later this term came to mean 
someone that rejected belief. A skeptic referred to anyone that defended belief as a ‘dogmatist’, 
regardless of how rational their argument was.181 
 The Stoics responded to Arcesilaus’ critique with one of their own. They posed the 
question that would perennially plague skeptics, “How can one act, if one cannot assent to a 
belief?” For, if one believes that they can know nothing of the world around them, how is it that 
they can determine a proper course of action? For philosophy in this period, there can be no 
separation of the epistemological stance and ethical considerations, a theory of knowledge is not 
complete without a theory of action as it cannot fulfill the goals of philosophy—wisdom, 
happiness, and justice. 
 
179 John O’Meara, Contra Academicos (Westminster, MD, 1950), 15, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1582424?origin=crossref. 
180 The idea of the Criterion of Truth was introduced by Epicurus, (341-270 BCE). 
181 Keith Lehrer, a contemporary skeptic, still uses this term to denote anyone that professes a theory of knowledge. 
See, Keith Lehrer, “Why Not Skepticism?,” in Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, by 
Pojman, Louis P. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998), 60–67. 
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Arcesilaus argued that both animals and plants can act without reason. A person can act 
with reason without assenting to a belief that initiates the action. Further, since no impression 
can be proved true, it is not reasonable to depend on belief for action. Arcesilaus went on to 
adopt the empiricist view of the Epicureans; all sense-perception is true, but belief can introduce 
falsity. The Academics became universally skeptical; the dictum “I am certain of nothing – not 
even the fact that I am certain of nothing”182 is attributed to Arcesilaus. For these skeptics, it was 
better to avoid the possibility of falsehood completely by suspending judgment; therefore, 
perception and belief were separated. To respond to the challenge of ethics, a skeptic could act 
on the best perceptions, rationally evaluated, while avoiding assent to an impression. 
 Carneades, and the next generation of Academic skeptics, continued the debate with the 
Stoics. They argued that no impression can be objectively determined to be better than another, 
therefore cognitive impressions cannot be superior to any other impressions. With no way to 
identify which impressions are ‘cognitive impressions’, one can only suspend judgment. The 
Stoics, in response, added the qualification “one that has no impediment”,183 to their definition of 
cognitive impression. There may be factors, external to an impression, that may cause the 
observer to withhold the judgment that it is ‘cognitive’ and reliable. Carneades continued to 
 
182 John Heil, “Augustine’s Attack on Skepticism: The Contra Academicos,” The Harvard Theological Review 65, 
no. 1 (1972): 101. 
183 Katja Vogt, “Ancient Skepticism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 
2016 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), 3.2, i., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/skepticism-ancient/. 
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define a skeptical theory of action, though he seems to have left the original framework of 
Arcesilaus.  He developed a three-stage criterion for determining action: 
1. In important issues, a skeptic must act on what is persuasive – meaning an impression 
that is rationally convincing, or perhaps even plausible. 
2. In more important issues, a skeptic must act on what is persuasive and ‘undiverted’; 
that is that there is no conflict between the persuasive and any neighboring 
arguments. 
3. In matters of happiness, a skeptic must consider what is persuasive, undiverted and 
‘explored’. By explored, other possible impressions have been tested and the 
persuasive impression is not diminished.184 
This criterion will become problematic for the skeptical argument; later, Sextus185 would call 
this a criterion of truth, not of action. Modern scholars also argue that it borders on a fallibilist 
epistemology.186 Carneades also develops the term ‘approval’ as opposed to the Stoic term 
‘assent’, but generally balance a thin semantic line between refusing to acknowledge a 
proposition as truth and the Stoic declaration of truth in fact. Augustine would later exploit this 
narrow distinction. The next generation of the Academy followed in these footsteps, narrowly 
 
184 Vogt, 3.2.ii. 
185 Sextus Empiricus, ca. 160-210 CE. 
186 Vogt, “Ancient Skepticism,” 3.2.ii. 
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distinguishing themselves from the Stoic position if only by a rejection of any criterion that 
involved truth. After Pyrrho,187 a new, radical brand of skeptic was born.  
Anecdotes about Pyrrho’s life galvanized the skeptic and the Stoic alike. For the skeptic, the 
idea that Pyrrho could be so unaffected by the world around him that he needed to be pulled from 
the path of a wagon, was worthy of envy. For the Stoic, that he could be so unaffected by a man 
drowning that he would keep walking and fail to render aid, was evidence of the horrific ethical 
state brought on by the skeptic’s lack of moral agency. In the Stoic ideal, ataraxia was a 
discipline that reduced anxiety. Events in the external world did not cause emotional turmoil that 
would disrupt one’s happiness–the philosopher was still wholly obligated to be a good, moral 
citizen. For Pyrrho and his followers, the ideal was to allow as little commitment to the 
appearance of things as possible to live a tranquil life. Pyrrho offered three considerations to aid 
in developing skeptic tranquility. 
1. Consider what are things by nature: Pyrrho made the metaphysical claim that all 
things are indeterminate, as such the nature of them is beyond our grasp. 
2. Consider how one should be disposed toward these things: Our beliefs cannot be 
evaluated and thus are neither true nor false. 
 
187 365/60–275/70 BCE. 
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3. Consider what the result of this interaction should be: We cannot say anything, or if 
necessary, only speak in the mode of ‘no more’ to capture the indeterminate nature of 
things.188  
In light of this indetermination, the proper way of life is speechlessness and tranquility. This 
doctrine became attractive to certain members of the Athenian Academy that were beginning to 
find its teachings overly dogmatic. Aenesidemus189 was one such philosopher; he worked to 
formalize the teachings of Pyrrho. The first principle was that the skeptic must live according to 
appearances. To avoid falling into belief about those appearances, one must always put them in 
opposition with another thought or appearance. This will generate equipollence190 between 
observations, causing the perceiver to suspend judgment. Living in suspended judgment will free 
the skeptic from the anxiety of error and produce tranquility.   
To aid in this endeavor, Aenesidemus penned his famous Ten Modes (or Tropes). These are 
arguments that a skeptic can use to develop an opposition to any appearance, proposition or 
dogmatic argument. The Ten Modes are chiefly concerned with constructing opposition to 
appearances by proposing possible circumstances in which the object in question would, or 
could, appear differently. “Sextus himself holds that the Mode from Relativity (the Eighth Mode 
in his account) is in some sense architectonic for all the other: relativity is the basic form of 
 
188 Vogt, “Ancient Skepticism,” 4.1. 
189 Aenesidemus, ca. first century BCE. 
190 Equipollence was a term used by Sextus Empiricus to indicate a position where all arguments on all sides of a 
question are of equal strength, causing the suspension of judgment. Robert Audi, ed., Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy, Second Ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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sceptical argumentation”191  Arippa192 formulated what Sextus Empiricus called the Five Modes. 
These ‘modes’ were to be used by the skeptic to introduce equipollence within argumentation.  
1. Argument from disagreement. In any matter that comes to an undecided 
conflict, (ordinary or philosophical) and leaves the skeptic unable to choose or 
reject either position, judgment must be suspended. 
2. Argument leading to infinite regress. An argument brought forward to make a 
matter credible also needs to be supported, ad infinitum. With no possible starting 
or ending to the argument, judgment must be suspended. 
3. Argument from relativity. The matter only appears in certain relation to the 
observer and the accompanying objects. If the object cannot be determined as it is 
itself, judgement must be suspended. 
4. Hypothesis: Assumption without argument. To prevent infinite regress (a 
dogmatist) will assume something as a starting point without proper argument. 
The hypothesis may be wrong or a competing hypothesis could be formulated, 
judgement must be suspended. 
 
191 R. J. Hankinson, “Values, Objectivity, and Dialectic; The Sceptical Attack on Ethics: Its Methods, Aims, and 
Success,” Phronesis 39, no. 1 (March 1994): 46, https://doi.org/10.1163/156852894321052243. 
192 Arippa, first to second century CE. 
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5. Arguments that fall into circularity. An argument in support of the matter at 
hand also requires the original argument to confirm itself.  Unable to assume one 
argument in order to establish the other, judgement must be suspended.193   
It can be seen, these modes of argumentation would impact the kerygmatic nature of the 
Gospel of Christ. With these modes as aids, a skeptic should have the tools to reduce any 
appearance, assertion, or belief to one possible option in a field of equal, possible 
understandings. The modes cannot be wantonly employed however, care must be taken, or one 
could fall to dogmatism them self. For example, a skeptic must use restraint when arguing that an 
issue is undecided (Mode 1), to extend the debate and declare it undecidable would be to fall into 
dogmatic assumption. Instead, a wise skeptic will know when to develop opposition from an 
alternate mode, such as forcing the dogmatist into an infinite regression of arguments. These 
modes are the exemplar for the skeptical mindset, the purpose was to make it difficult for any 
enterprising interlocutor to argue in favor of a positive viewpoint.  
Survey of Contra Academicos  
The skeptic’s framework was, by the third century CE, highly developed. It was well crafted, 
complex, and espoused by some of the most influential and eloquent people of the time. A young 
rhetorician named Augustine is an example of an educated, well read, and thoughtful person 
enthralled by the teachings of the New Academy, and in particular, the writings of Cicero.  “It 
 
193 Adapted from Vogt, “Ancient Skepticism,” 4.3. 
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will be remembered that Augustine, two or at most three years before the date of the Contra 
Academicos gave allegiance to the New Academy”194 Throughout the dialogues that make up 
this work, Augustine has a complex mix of attitudes toward his former master.  At one point he 
states “I should never even by way of joking have attempted to attack the Academics…”195 
 O’Meara, in his introduction to this translation, noted that ‘Contra Academicos’ may not 
even be the best title, “his work can be called ‘de Academicis’”196, or ‘On the Academics’. His 
respect for Cicero is evident:  
There is no doubt but that Cicero’s Academica was the primary source upon 
which Augustine drew both for is version of the teaching of the New Academy, 
and also, in part for his refutation of the same.197  
Augustine overtly cites Academica, and scholars generally agree that most of Contra 
Academicos has a direct correlation to something already addressed by Cicero.198  Within the 
dialogue, Augustine recommends, by title, Cicero’s works and is delighted when his 
interlocutors are already familiar with them. The theme of respect for Cicero and the general 
teaching of the (New) Academy run throughout: 
“Well, then,” said Licentius, “what about our own renowned Cicero? 
What do you think of him? 
 
194 O’Meara, Contra Academicos, 15. 
195 O’Meara, 15. 
196 O’Meara, 17. 
197 O’Meara, 14. 
198 Heil, “Augustine’s Attack on Skepticism,” 101. 
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After a prolonged silence, the other replied: “He was a wise man.” 
“In that case,” said Licentius, “his opinion on the point at issue has some 
weight with you, has it not?” 
“It has,” was the reply199 
 Augustine’s deference for the New Academy and its philosophical stance, begs the 
question–what motivated him to shift from a pledged adherent to refutation of skepticism as the 
driving force of his first writing projects?200  
 Of course, within this timeframe, occurred Augustine’s much discussed conversion to 
Christianity. This fact does explain the new vocational trajectory from young teacher and 
rhetorician to Christian theologian, eventual Bishop of Hippo, and consideration as one of the 
Early Church Fathers. These dialogues, however, are not overtly theological; there is but little 
evangelical fervor, and only in the material addressed directly to Romanianus, as recipient of 
these transcripts.  A better explanation for this change in commitment is that as part of 
Augustine’s spiritual conversion, he experienced a significant epistemological conversion. 
Athough he underwent this transformation, Augustine still deeply held to the general 
Platonic philosophy of the “Old Academy”. There is a large body of scholarly work that 
discusses the influences of Plotinus, Porphry, and Neo-Platonism on Augustine’s theology.201 To 
that point, Augustine openly cites the Platonists as useful, “if those who are called philosophers, 
 
199C. Acad. I.3.7.  
200 The three works, Contra Academicos, De beata vita, and De ordine are grouped together as the Dialogues of 
Cassiciacum. All are considered the earliest extant works of Augustine and all report supposed actual dialogues in 
November 386 C.E. (O’Meara, 3). 
201 This topic is outside the scope of this current work. 
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and especially the Platonists, have said aught that is true and in harmony with our faith, we are 
not only not to shrink from it, but to claim it for our own use from those who have unlawful 
possession of it.”202 No doubt, statements like this are what justifies Kierkegaard in decrying 
Augustine’s “incalculable harm”203 of Christian teaching by infusing it with Platonic dualism.  
This assessment may not be entirely fair. Augustine is without a doubt, committed to 
certain Platonic ideas. As we see in C. Acad. he unabashedly attempts to recover what he views 
as the original Platonic program of seeking knowledge. At the same time, even in his early days 
as a Christian, he finds at the close of C. Acad. that the Incarnate Christ is the ultimate arbiter of 
knowledge. The remaining Cassiciacum dialogues are dedicated to showing that the ultimate 
knowledge is God.  
Though he valued Platonism, Augustine did not intend for it to be determinative over 
Christian teaching. Pannenberg would make a case for judicious learning “by taking up 
Augustine’s argument that science and knowledge must serve wisdom.”204 Wisdom is grasping 
the Beata Vita,205 of doing “good works in Christ to cling with constancy to Him … that the 
breast may not be swollen with that knowledge which puffeth up, nor boast of [heathen 
knowledge]”206 While Augustine ontologically classified Being according to a dualistic 
 
202 Doc. chr. II.40.60. 
203 Kierkegaard, as quoted by Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming 
Biblical Reading, 277. 
204 Pannenberg as noted by Thiselton, 334. 
205 De beata vita, “The Happy Life” is Augustine’s second Cassiciacum dialogue following Contra Academicos.  
206 Doc. chr. II.41.62. 
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framework, (i.e. corporeal/divine, profane/spiritual) –as a matter of praxis, he sought to hold the 
two in tension. Even for Plato, ‘knowledge’ necessitated proper political/social ethics.207  
The Incarnation of Christ, however, was an impetus to re-address the nature of 
knowledge. “But now men—even in the mass—had become capable of receiving all spiritual 
doctrine because of the cleansing and elevation of mankind through the coming of the Savior. It 
was time for the Academy to cease from its negative and skeptical teaching.”208 Traditionally, 
two levels of knowledge had been considered: “popular knowledge for the masses and 
philosophical knowledge for the few was much stressed in antiquity.”209 For Augustine, it was of 
deep theological import that this duality was defeated, for the Gospel had to effectively engage 
all, the philosopher and the ‘mass’ alike. 
This new religious conviction in no way diminished his commitment to philosophy, he 
simply began to enthusiastically engage in philosophy with a new vision of its perfection in the 
Incarnation. “Come with me, then, to philosophy. Here there is everything that is wont 
wonderfully to move you whenever you are anxious and hesitating,”210 Augustine exhorts 
Romaninius. In his introduction to Book I, Augustine blurs the lines between a love of 
philosophy and accepting the Christian faith. He writes: 
 
207 Cf. Plato, The Republic. 
208 O’Meara, Contra Academicos, 17. 
209 O’Meara, 170. 
210 C. Acad. II.2.3. 
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by our prayers we may win…you back to us, and allow your mind, which for so 
long has yearned for respite, to emerge at length into the fresh air of true freedom. 
…It is this thought, proposed in declarations of doctrines most fruitful and far 
removed from the understanding of the uninitiated, that philosophy to which I call 
you promises to make clear to her true devotees.211 
Augustine’s missionary impulse to win his friend to Christian faith was not to write a 
doctrinal treatise or personal testimonial, but to exhort him to accept the possibility of true 
knowledge. 
 Wake up! wake up! I beg you…She [philosophy] now nourishes and 
cherishes me in that leisure which we have so much desired. She has freed me 
entirely from that heresy212 … For she teaches, and teaches truly, …[and] 
promises to make known clearly the true and hidden God and is on the very point 
of deigning to present Him to our view—as it were, through shining clouds.213 
The second reason for this new epistemological concern was the perennial challenge to 
skepticism, that of ethics. Even the venerated Cicero had no real solution for the gap. He was 
“inclined toward skepticism, though he refused to acknowledge the skeptic’s dismissal of 
objective morality.”214 This was a difficult dichotomy to maintain. Many contemporary scholars 
find “two Ciceros,” “Cicero the politician” and “Cicero the great exponent of humane living.”215 
He is interpreted as claiming the mantle of Plato’s Academy and its skeptical doctrine, but also 
developing a political/ethical praxis that was Stoic in nature “…so evidently in De Officiis, De 
 
211 C. Acad. I.1.3. 
212 Referring to the heresy of Manicheism, which Augustine, shortly after these dialogues in Cassiciacum, would 
take up his pen to refute. 
213 C. Acad. I.1.3. 
214 Heil, “Augustine’s Attack on Skepticism,” 101. 
215 Walter Nicgorski, “Cicero’s Paradoxes and His Idea of Utility,” Political Theory 12, no. 4 (November 1, 1984): 
559, https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591784012004006. 
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Legibus and elsewhere in his work, Cicero embraces stoic positions.”216 Cicero’s positive 
political endeavors appear too close to Stoic ethics for the comfort of modern observers. This, of 
course, would have been a fatal philosophical faux pas, given the generations-long feud between 
the two schools of thought. Scholarly interpretation aside, the difficulty of maintaining both a 
skeptical epistemology and a positive political philosophy becomes an easy target for those with 
other agendas.217  
 For Augustine, in the context of developing a Christian ethic, there can be little room for 
this dichotomy between theory and praxis. “It will be seen that it is not so much the content of 
skeptical discourse which disturbs Augustine, but the effects of such discourse on the minds of 
men.”218  If the truth of the Gospel of Grace had come in order to be known, and the ‘mass’ was 
intended to determine proper living in its light, there was no place for dogmatic skepticism to 
interfere with a proper Christian epistemology.  
The effectiveness of Augustine’s arguments refuting his former fellow Academicians is 
subject to debate.  In his introduction, O’Meara (in 1950) was far more interested in the 
historical-critical issue of confirming the Plotninus/Porphry influence in Augustine’s theological 
work. He determines that “Contra Academicos cannot be recommended as a valuable 
 
216 Nicgorski, 560. 
217 Walter Nicgorski attempts to unite these paradoxes in Cicero on utilitarian grounds, but that is not the issue at 
hand. 
218 Heil, “Augustine’s Attack on Skepticism,” 99. 
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contribution to the theory of knowledge, nor even as an answer to skepticism.”219 For him the 
great treasure here is that it is strictly a ‘personal work’ confirming, at least thematically in his 
view, that Augustine was a Neo-Platonist; furthermore, that those philosophical commitments 
are an interpretive key to understanding his whole body of theological works.  
To the modern commentators’ point, Augustine is clearly influenced by the Platonist 
school and makes no attempt to extricate himself from his philosophical roots. He follows the 
conventions of writing philosophy in dialogue form, as well as in explicit (though selective) 
affirmation of views held by Cicero, particularly, as inherited from Plato. In his opening address, 
he clearly asks Romaninius to consider this new Christian doctrine as the perfection of Platonic 
happiness – there is no request to abandon philosophy for a newfound religious commitment.  
John Heil, takes a different (and possibly singular) approach to Contra Academicos and 
its effectiveness.220 He asserts that commentators naturally interpret Augustine’s use of 
Licentius’ argumentation (as the voice of refutation) as “direct frontal assaults on the skeptical 
point of view.”221 Through such a lens, indeed, there is no definitive, convincing argument; Heil 
proposes that this interpretation diminishes the purpose of these dialogues. Augustine knew (as a 
former adherent) that challenging skeptics on their own terms, and from within their own 
framework would never be convincing–to a skeptic or an observer alike. The skeptics had, after 
 
219 O’Meara, Contra Academicos, 18. 
220 “To my knowledge, this interpretation has not been discussed by any of the commentators on the Contra 
Academicos,” Heil, 110. 
221 Heil, “Augustine’s Attack on Skepticism,” 110. 
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all, spent generations developing the art of equipollence. As Augustine argues in Book III, they 
had managed to stay above the fray in the cultural debate with both Stoic and Epicurean 
proponents.222 What proposition can you produce to convince someone of anything if they deny 
the legitimacy of belief in all propositions? 
In Heil’s view, Augustine constructed a much more sophisticated argument than he has 
received credit for. In Contra Academicos, Heil finds the following argumentation: 
1. Certain knowledge is possible,  
a. Knowledge is interaction between  
i. Reason (as incorrigible) 
ii. The will 
iii. Producing cognition 
b. It is equally likely ‘Appearances’ are reliable as not 
i. Since they typically function as they should, doubt should be 
reasoned, not assumed 
2. Skepticism functions by disciplining the will to act without reason, 
a. Causing a focus inward, toward the will 
b. Rather than outward toward reason 
 
222 C. Acad. III.7.16. 
80 
 
c. This emptying of reason equates to a reduction to “complete 
unconsciousness,”223 not tranquility 
3. This is a moral issue 
a. The skeptic’s “perfectly tranquil mental state”224 is “unintelligible” 
and “ineffectual” 
b. It must deny  
i. Prima Facia knowledge  
ii. Analytic knowledge 
c. At minimum, these types of knowledge are necessary for 
ethical/political function 
4. It is not a stretch into the irrational to assume that knowledge should be sought 
In Heil’s interpretation, Augustine develops argumentation to achieve three goals. The 
first, to reveal inconsistencies inherent to the skeptical framework itself. The second, “by 
offering examples of what might ordinarily be called “certain knowledge” and showing that 
these examples are quite intelligible”.225 The third, Augustine works to establish an ethical basis 
for the epistemological quest, one that “locates virtue and happiness in the process of 
apprehending the truth.”226 
 
223 Heil, “Augustine’s Attack on Skepticism,” 108. 
224 Heil, 109. 
225 Heil, 110. 
226 Heil, 110. 
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The first dialogue (Book I) revolves around the definition of ‘happiness’.227 Book II 
expounds the doctrine of the New Academy, noting, in particular, the distinctives between the 
“New” and the “Old” Academies. The debate centers around the terms probabile and veri simile. 
In Book III, the dialogue resumes to find the meaning of ‘fortune’ and to parse the difference 
between a ‘wise man’ and a ‘philosopher’. Augustine himself then takes up refuting the skeptical 
takeover of the Academy, he enters a plea for a return to Socratic methodologies for seeking 
truth. Nowhere in the dialogues does Augustine counter skepticism with a positivist 
epistemological stance, perhaps to the consternation of the above modern commentator(s). He 
does not attempt to propose any new methodology, nor does he adapt either the materialist 
position of the Stoics or the empiricism of the Epicureans.    
Happiness, Error, and Wisdom in the Search of Truth 
As the dialogue opens, the interlocutors are in agreement that the statement “we ought to know 
truth,”228 is the ideal. Furthermore, knowledge of the truth, even if it did not increase happiness, 
is preferable to ignorance. Augustine clarifies a definition of happiness as one “who lives in 
 
227 Note: ‘Happiness’ in parlance of antiquity is not equivalent to the contemporary idea which is more situational, 
but rather implies an inner peace or absence of inner turmoil. Augustine’s definition here is that the right order of 
human being-ness is achieved; i.e. living under discipline of reason. (cf Platonic dialogues). 
228 C. Acad. I.2.5. 
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conformity with that part of his spirit which, as is right, should govern the other parts.”229 He 
adds, for the benefit of the skeptical interlocutor, that the ‘best’ is the ‘mind’ or ‘reason’.230  
Licentius presents the argument against the skeptical position that avoiding the possibility 
of error will lead to ataraxia. 
Suppose that a man is not seeking anything and is asked, for example, if it is now 
daytime, and without due reflection at once conjectures that it is nighttime and 
replies to that effect, do you not think that that man is in error? Your definition, 
then, has not embraced even this monstrous kind of error.231  
Simply avoiding the search for, and assent to, knowledge cannot be sufficient to avoid 
error. This person cannot be deemed to be free from error simply because they did not seek 
knowledge and withheld assent. Therefore, the definition of error must include statements that do 
not reflect actuality, regardless of whether the observer is intentional about them. Licentius then 
proffers a modified definition of ‘error’ as “the approbation as true of what is not true.”232 
In Chapter 5 the question “What is Wisdom?” is taken up; Augustine offers the Stoic 
definition as “the knowledge of things human and divine.”233 The group finds that some people 
 
229 C. Acad. I.3.9. 
230 For Augustine ‘reason’ in a special sense is ‘incorrigible’, see Heil, 107.   
231 C. Acad. I.4.11. 
232 C. Acad. I.4.11. 
233 Note: ‘divinity’ here, as throughout this dialogue does not indicate specific Christian theological ideas, but the 
general Platonic sense of non-corporeal knowledge. C. Acad. I.5.16. (direct quote from Cicero in De officiis, a 
definition attributed to the Stoics). 
83 
 
seem to be given the gift of knowledge, and yet do not act accordingly. They cannot therefore be 
wise. 234 Wisdom must be found in the seeking, not only the possession of, knowledge. 
The argumentation of Book I is closed with an account of wisdom as “not only the 
knowledge of, but the diligent search for, those things human and divine which have relation to 
happiness.”235 This conclusion directly challenges the Academic doctrine of ataraxia through 
avoidance of error as sufficient criterion for happiness and wisdom.  
Skepticism is Inconsistent  
Book II begins with a lengthy (three chapter) exhortation to Romanianus.236 Augustine implores 
Romanianus not to fall into either of two impediments to those who seek knowledge. The first, is 
to grow tired of seeking truth, either because of laziness or because one doubts one’s own 
capacity to obtain it. The second is to “believe yourself to have already found it”.237 Augustine 
urges Romanianus to continue to seek, for “in the manner in which you know that the sum of one 
and two and three and four is ten…knowledge is not to be despaired of, and it will be clearer 
than those numbers are.”238 
 
234 The interlocutors cite the example of a spiritist that seems to have the gift of knowledge of spiritual things, yet 
lives an amoral life—clearly he has knowledge but it not wise.   
235 C. Acad. I.8.23. 
236 Romanianus took Augustine in, supported him financially as well as relationally after the death of his father (C. 
Acad.  II, ii, 3). 
237 C. Acad. II.3.9. Here Augustine may be alluding to Romanianus’ adherence to Manichaeanism (King 33). 
238 C. Acad. II.3.9. 
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Augustine, in giving an overview of the philosophy of the New Academy to his 
interlocutors, introduces his understanding of its development. Augustine opines that the break in 
the Academy was not due to shortcomings of its own teaching but was a response to the Stoics’ 
introduction of positivism. Arcesilaus strenuously objected to this teaching and feared the 
potential error it could cause wise people to adopt. To counter that error, he began to deny that 
knowledge was possible at all.  
The entire Academy did not readily adopt new skeptical doctrine; Antiochus, a follower 
of Philo, viewed these teachings as the threat to the Academy. He held to the doctrine that a 
“wise man could perceive truth”.239 Antiochus “appealed to the testimonies of the physicists of 
old, and to other great philosophers to prove his point.”240 He declared that it was the skeptics 
that were breaking with accepted doctrines and began to refer to Arcesilaus and his followers as 
the New Academy. As Augustine argues, the skepticism of the Academy is not even wholly 
accepted by the Academy itself. 
To counter the Stoic ethical critique, the Academy was forced to develop the doctrines of 
probability (probibile) and what-is-like-truth (veri simile). Augustine, through a brief parable 
shows that these doctrines are not sound. No one can make a claim of similarity without 
knowledge of the first object of comparison. “They say that in practical matters they follow 
 
239 C. Acad. II.6.15. 
240 C. Acad. II.6.15. 
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‘what-is-like-truth,’ although actually they do not know what truth itself is.”241 To determine 
how to act rightly, the skeptics must allow that they act according to something, while also 
avoiding assent. For their teachings to avoid ethical nihilism, the Academy was forced to develop 
a truth-like proximation anyway.  
Not until chapter nine does Augustine verbalize his moral objection to skepticism.  “We 
are concerned with life, with morality, with the spirit – that spirit which hopes to overcome the 
antagonism of every kind of illusion…”242 He has a teleological issue with skeptical teaching. 
“Somehow or other [the Academics] persuaded me of the probability…that man cannot find 
truth. Consequently, I became lazy and very slothful, nor did I have the courage to seek for what 
clever and learned men were not permitted to find.”243 The energy behind these dialogues, his 
exhortations and his rebukes, lies in his moral objection to raising a stumbling block to those that 
desire knowledge, wisdom, and happiness. For no one is going to seek that which “learned men” 
has convinced them they cannot attain. That unattainable object, knowledge, is precisely what 
Augustine is imploring his audience (both directly in the dialogue itself as well as the recipient(s) 
of the transcript) to seek. His exhortation is both for the sake of philosophy and his newfound 
Christological epistemology. 
 
241 C. Acad. II.7.19. 
242 C. Acad. II.9.22. 
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The Image of Proteus as Criterion 
In the third dialogue of C. Acad., Augustine develops several propositional arguments. As an 
example, after the assembled group establishes the existence of a wise person, he proposes the 
following disjunctive: 
For the Academics maintained, or rather opined, at one and the same time that the 
wise man could exist, but that, nevertheless, man could not attain to knowledge. 
Therefore, they actually claimed that the wise man knows nothing. But you 
believe that he knows wisdom, which certainly is not identical with knowing 
nothing.244 
Augustine continues to press Alypius (as interlocutor on behalf of the Academy) to make 
concessions, namely that wise people do exist; and that, as much as it is possible, they can posses 
knowledge. This is still not a defeat for sceptics however, as they can still withhold assent from 
all knowledge. As Alypuis challenges:  
Even though I should concede," he said, "what you are so anxiously striving for, 
namely, that the wise man knows wisdom, and that between us we have 
discovered something which the wise man can know, nevertheless, I do not at all 
think that the whole case of the Academics has been undermined. Indeed, I notice 
that they can fall back on a stronghold that is by no means weak, and that their 
line of retreat has not been cut off. They can still withhold assent. … They would 
have us notice that their behaviour is illustrated and mirrored, so to speak, by that 
of Proteus245 who, it is said, could be caught only by means which invariably did 
not result in his capture. His pursuers were never sure that what they had was still 
he, unless some divinity informed them.246 
 
244 C. Acad. III.4.10. 
245 C. Acad.  III.5.11. Note: Proteus was a sea god in Homer’s Odyssey and Virgil’s Georgic. Proteus would reveal 
truth, but only when compelled. The god would change form while in the questioner’s grasp in order to startle them 
and loosen their grip. Only by holding fast, could a seeker learn the truth they sought.  
246 C. Acad. III.5.11. 
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 Alypius brings focus to the “chasm posited by the Academics between the truth and the 
truth-like.”247 Just as those who sought Proteus could never be sure, for the god may change 
again, truth was subject to appearances, which could change. “’But who will indicate truth for 
us?’ [the Academics] ask”.248 Augustine is thrilled by this development, for the epistemological 
question has changed. It has now been established that a person can, at least probably, know 
something. The question has now become, ‘How will truth be indicated?’   
 Augustine then turns the metaphor of Proteus upside down. 
That Proteus – so that you, boys, may see that poets are not to be entirely 
disregarded in philosophy – is portrayed after the image of the truth. In poems, I 
say, Proteus manifests and bears the person of truth, which no one can lay hold 
on, if he is deceived by false images, and loosens or loses his hold on the nodes of 
understanding. For even when the truth is being grasped and, as it were, held in 
our hands, those images strive in the usual manner of corporeal things – to 
deceive and delude us through the very senses which we use for the needs of this 
life249 
 Augustine’s reference to Proteus, as the arbiter of truth, may be read as an early allusion 
to the Incarnate Christ. Gerald Boersma finds certain parallels in these images; first, they 
embody and reveal truth. Second, “their character of truth is not immediately perceived.” 250  
Third, their physical appearance ‘deceives and deludes’, when grasped according to “his 
temporal and material condition; he is, then, not perceived as and image translucent to eternal 
 
247 Gerald P. Boersma, “‘Proteus Rising from the Sea’: A Note on Proteus in Contra Academicos,” Heythrop 
Journal 57, no. 4 (July 2016): 693, https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12165. 
248 C. Acad. III.5.12. 
249 C. Acad. III.6.13. Translation, Boersma. 
250 Gerald P. Boersma, “‘Proteus Rising from the Sea,'" 694. 
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truth.” “Proteus as ‘image of the truth’ poetically attests to the possibility of the Incarnation – 
that eternal truth can be temporally revealed and embodied.”251 This imagery is also referred to 
in De ordine as an image of the intersection of Divine truth as embodied in the finite order.252 
 Augustine also points out that Alypius himself included “unless some divinity informed 
them” as a caveat for the appearance of Proteus. “Your words were brief but full of piety. There 
has been nothing in our discussion which has given me more delight, nothing more profound, 
nothing more probable, and, provided, so I trust, that divinity be present to us, nothing more 
true.”253 Curiously, Augustine, makes no more of this imagery but ends the dialogue for the day 
on this exuberant note, “… lest I become more excited mentally than is good for my body.”254  
It is possible that this is the apex of the entire dialogue. Here the connection is made 
between the ‘knowledge of things human and divine’ as determined was required for happiness 
in Book I.5. The Academicians (as represented) have been forced to admit that knowledge was at 
least possible, though in need of a reliable Criterion. Here, Alypius introduces imagery that 
Augustine enthusiastically re-interprets as this potential human-divine Criterion. He then closes 
the discussion for the day.  
 
251 Boersma, “‘Proteus Rising from the Sea,’” 694. 
252 De ordine II.15. 
253 C. Acad. III.6.13. 
254 C. Acad. III.6.13. 
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Augustine does not, however, begin the next day on this line of discussion. He instead, 
continues to undermine the Academic position of wisdom by deferral of assent.  He constructs 
more disjunctive propositions in which they cannot assent to either position. They would have to 
either concede that knowledge is at least possible, or that their doctrine amounts to wisdom 
through ignorance.  
Augustine, thinks little of the skeptic redefining ‘wisdom’ as ‘the study of wisdom’ rather 
than the attainment of wisdom. He mocks them as saying, “If you devote yourself to her 
[wisdom] you will never indeed be wise while you live here…your spirit will enjoy wisdom 
unencumbered after this life, that is, when you will have ceased to be a man.”255 Or rather 
saying, “Come mortal men, to philosophy. Here there is much to be gained. After all, what can 
be dearer to man than wisdom? Come, then, so that you may become wise – and not know 
wisdom.” 256 For Augustine, the skeptic position is distilled down to these two possible 
statements, which if they were to honestly admit either one, they would be shunned as madmen. 
The Limitations of Skepticism 
Augustine then moves to address specific arguments that the Academy had developed. He states 
again “Knowledge still doesn’t abandon us, even if we’re uncertain about it. We know that 
Zeno’s definition is either true or false. Hence we do not know nothing.”257 He turns his attention 
 
255 C. Acad. III.9.20 
256 C. Acad. III.9.20. 
257 C. Acad. III.9.21 trans. King. 
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to Carneades who at some point ‘woke up’ to the difficulty of his Academy’s position in light of 
perception. Augustine relates Carneades’ thinking, “Now Carneades, are you really going to 
claim that you do not know whether you are a man or an insect? … Let us say that the things that 
we do not know are those about which philosophers inquire.” Even Carneades realized that there 
were areas of knowledge that are required for everyday life and are ridiculous to deny. To 
maintain the skeptical doctrine, he separated those disciplines from philosophy. In this realm, he 
pointed to disagreements between philosophers as proof that knowledge was not possible.  
Augustine opposes this separation, for even on the question of how this world is ordered, 
he can claim to know that the world either always existed and will always do so, or the world 
began at some point and thereafter will always exist; or began and will cease to exist. It is 
enough, Augustine claims, to know that according to the way the world is, either by the nature of 
existence or divine structuring, that those are the options and there are no others.  
To suspend judgment on which of these possibilities to assert is a legitimate function of 
knowledge. The skeptic cannot force an interlocutor into taking an unsupportable position, only 
to argue they may be wrong. For the skeptic cannot prove that any of the options is the only 
correct one, nor can they argue that any of them are demonstrably false. Similarly, they cannot 
argue that any of the choices ‘appears like falsehood.’  
Reliability of Sense Perception 
The skeptic can reply that one cannot even be sure that the world exists, because our sense-
perception is deceptive. Augustine, however rejects this, “Your arguments were never able to 
disown the power of our senses to the extent of clearly establishing that nothing seems to be so to 
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us.”258 For the Academics can only posit that things may not be as they appear, and they are 
unable to establish that perception is consistently and substantially unreliable. The skeptic cannot 
cast doubt on the issue based on possible dream-states or madness. For the senses cannot be 
“blamed for the fact that insane people have illusions, or that we see in our dreams things that are 
not true. If the senses give reports that are true to those who are awake and sane, then they will 
not be involved in what the mind of one who is asleep or insane, conjures up.”259 
‘But’ says the skeptic, ‘we can be deceived by our senses.’ Augustine takes a different 
approach to this common objection. “If when an oar was dipped under water it presented itself as 
straight, then in that case I would convict my eyes of giving a report that was not true.”260 To the 
observer’s eyes, an oar should appear bent in the water, it is not a deception or failure of the 
senses. The same with the other classic arguments for everyday sensory ‘illusions’ that plagued 
philosophical discussions of perception. Human beings learn to expect certain factors to change 
the way we perceive the world around us. We expect them and adjust accordingly – we are not 
the victims of deceitful or unreliable senses. 
In chapter twelve, Augustine determines that perception plays no part in knowledge of 
ethics; for if one determines that pleasure is the highest good (Epicureans) the relativity of 
certain sensory perceptions will not seriously affect the process. Likewise, if a wise person were 
 
258 C. Acad. III.11.24. Translated, King. 
259 C. Acad. III.11.25. 
260 C. Acad. III.11.26. 
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to make a decision about the ultimate good in a dream, upon awaking he/she could always 
change their mind – no one would begrudge them that.  As for the fear of insanity, “either a 
man’s wisdom is lost because of his madness, … and he does not know truth; or his knowledge 
remains in his intellect,”261 and he behaves as though in a dream. Either state is an exception 
from seeking wisdom and not a problematic issue for wisdom itself. 
Augustine’s final argument against the Academic Skeptics is something of a conspiracy 
theory. In it, he suggests that the Academy simply adopted skepticism publicly, and only to 
prevent the Academy and its teachings from being overwhelmed by either the Stoic or Epicurean 
doctrines. Secretly, the Platonists still held to the original doctrines as ‘mysteries’ to be 
preserved, “concealing completely the doctrine of the Academy and in burying it as gold to be 
found at some time by posterity.”262 In this state of hibernation, the “one system of really true 
philosophy”263 sat for generations until the Divine intervened and redeemed humanity to 
knowledge. Augustine specifically notes one doctrine:  
It is enough for my purpose that Plato thought that there were two worlds, one 
intelligible, where truth itself resided, and this sensible world which, it is clear, 
we apprehend by sight and touch. The first was the true world, while the latter 
was made like the true world and after its image.264 
 
 
261 C. Acad. III.12.28. 
262 C. Acad. III.17.38. 
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The value of Platonic doctrine was in the possibility of truth and of knowledge; the 
physical world was a sign, giving humanity access to the overlying spiritual truth. The image of 
Proteus as truth directed by the divine is connected to this doctrine. 
 
… the most subtle reasoning would never recall souls blinded by the manifold 
darkness of error and stained deeply by the slime of the body, had not the most 
high God, because of a certain compassion for the masses, bent and submitted the 
authority of the divine intellect even to the human body itself.265 
 The rescue of knowledge itself, and of the Platonic ‘complete system of philosophy’, was 
mounted by God Himself in the incarnational act of His Son.  
Augustine ends his refutation by stating that he, at thirty-three years old, is not as yet 
confident that he has found wisdom; but has dedicated himself to the search. There are two 
forces to aid in this endeavor, authority and reason – and he has found no stronger authority than 
Jesus Christ to support him in this quest for knowledge.  
Possibility of Knowledge and Signification 
Modern commentators are rightly disappointed if they are anticipating a once-and-for-all victory 
over the skeptics.266 Their requirements for such a feat, however, were not at all a priority for 
Augustine.  He was not interested in countering skepticism by proposing another framework for 
knowledge. In fact, he is as eager to avoid the positivism of both Zeno and Epicurus as he is to 
 
265 C. Acad. III.19.42. 
266 cf O’Meara, Contra Academicos, 18. 
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refute skepticism. Augustine is not interested in a methodological approach to knowledge;267 he 
only wishes to establish that knowledge is at minimum possible, and that humanity must seek 
after it. This is far from the epistemological agenda of modern thought.  
Augustine did intend to establish the following in Contra Academicos: 
1. Skepticism may not even be the true doctrine of the Academicians. 
2. Skepticism is not a coherent system of thought 
a. Skepticism requires denying (or discounting) premia facie knowledge 
b. Whole disciplines of knowledge and human activity must be bracketed off to 
sustain it (i.e. mathematics, legal disciplines) 
c. To establish possible ethical foundations, it must propose a facsimile of truth  
d. Analytical logic leads it to disjunctive propositions in which either option is 
self-defeating 
3. Skepticism is morally reprehensible 
a. It discourages people from seeking Truth 
b. It presupposes a distinction between the ‘philosopher’ and the ‘masses’ (the 
epistemological proletariat) 
4. Skepticism denies the divine epistemological project of the Incarnation 
 
267 The position that knowledge was not the product of a methodological process but was developed through modes 
of experience is what Gadamer would later advance in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Revised edition 
(London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2004). 
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In evaluating the efficacy of C. Acad., it is important to note that Augustine himself felt 
that he accomplished the task he set for himself. In his Retractions he only wishes to correct 
minor issues of presentation only. Certain word choices, and some ‘impious’ statements of a new 
Christian philosopher are his primary objections to his young implied author. The most 
substantive correction was “the praise with which I extolled Plato or the Platonists or the 
Academic philosophers…especially those against whose great errors Christian teaching must be 
defended.”268  This statement should caution the commentators against assuming that Augustine 
remained primarily committed to a Platonist viewpoint. While that position was openly stated in 
Contra Academicos, the argumentation itself also shows that Augustine held his philosophical 
beliefs as subject to critical evaluation considering Christian faith and teaching.  
The overall work of the dialogue, Augustine still affirms thirty years later. “The silences 
of the Retractationes, too, are at least as significant as the words: the remarkable fact is that 
Augustine believed that so much of his early work could stand uncorrected, especially given his 
pressing sense of responsibility to his audience.”269 He must have felt that this early dialogue (as 
part of the Cassiciacum trilogy) accomplished his intended goals, for he never substantively 
addressed the issue again in his industrious literary career. Naturally, it is debatable whether this 
argumentation is sufficient or effective, those are not questions for this project, as much as that 
 
268 Retractions, I.1.4. 
269 Catherine Conybeare, The Irrational Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 2. Although it is not in 
the scope of this project, it should be noted that Conybeare puts together an insightful analysis of dialogue as a genre 
for communicating philosophical reasoning and content. This analysis would be beneficial for any study of the 
classic philosophical dialogues. 
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discussion is worthwhile. What is pertinent for this project is to show that this argument is a vital 
part of Augustine’s hermeneutic. 
It is a temptation for contemporary readers of Christian Doctrine to understand the term 
‘doctrine’ in the sense of ‘dogma’ or ‘tradition’. In this sense, Book I is interpreted as church 
dogma, or catechesis. This is not what Augustine had in mind; for him, ‘doctrine’ implied ‘sound 
teaching,’ and he applied ‘doctrine’ to sound philosophical arguments and issues of Christian 
theology alike.270 The intended ‘doctrine’ in Doc. chr. is the lesson on the interpretation of 
scripture in Book IV; not the res of Book I which is the prolegomena to the intended lesson. In 
Doc. chr., the res is the foundation for interpretation. Augustine’s stated purpose of the text is to 
teach people to interpret scripture.271 Furthermore “All instruction is either about things (res) or 
about signs (signum),” the first book of Doc. chr. is dedicated to res “in the strict sense…that 
which is never employed as a sign of anything else.” 272 
There is a substantial distinction between the ‘things’ of scripture for the modern 
interpreter and the res for Augustine. For the modern interpreter, the ‘things’ are the historical 
critical content of the text. To find and interpret meaning, one attempts to re-create the events 
recorded in the text, and/or the life and mind of the author.  For Augustine, these are important 
 
270 cf C. Acad. I. 
271 Doc. chr.  I.1.1. 
272 Doc. chr. I.2.2. See also, Mag. 
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questions, but not the res as referent of scripture – as historikon they are also symbols, the 
ultimate res of scripture is the Divine Creator.   
It is here, that a Platonic worldview must cautiously be considered. If there is a 
distinction between the corporeal (inferior) and the spiritual (superior), the ultimate goal of 
knowledge is to grasp spiritual truth; all other knowledge must serve that purpose (see 
Augustine’s Rule in Mag. above). “The living bodily form itself,… is quite a distinct thing from 
the life by which it is quickened and animated by it. … [seekers of wisdom] are compelled to 
place above it, again, that unchangeable life, which is not at one time foolish, at another time 
wise, but on the contrary is wisdom itself.”273 This requires that the realm of the verbum and the 
realm of the corporeal combine to elucidate the spiritual realm as ‘wisdom itself’. Understanding 
the text and its relation to the corporeal (historikon) is part of the process to understanding the 
spiritual res that is the purpose of scripture. 
Having access to the res of language in general, and the res of scripture in particular, is 
essential to human understanding in general, but even more so, for the possibility of grasping 
ultimate Truth in Augustine’s Christian faith. To infringe on another’s confidence of this 
possibility is a moral issue, not just a theoretical problem.  
  
 
273 Doc.Chr. I.8.8 
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4. Reliability of Signs  
Thiselton writes, “Not until Ferdinand de Saussure did thinking about signs and signifiers in 
language become so sophisticated as that of Augustine.”274 It is ironic that through the 
structuralism of Saussure, linguistics were severed from res as its basis.  The world had been 
isolated from Descartes’ subjective mind, and now the language that the mind used was severed 
from the exterior referent. In structuralism “language is a system of interdependent terms in 
which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others.”275 For 
Wittgenstein, there was something to be gained using structuralism in the analysis of the 
‘language game’.  For other structuralists, the ‘code’ became abstracted from its contextual use. 
“But if the code is divorced from historic human life, how is it still related to language as a 
human activity?”276 Language could no longer be relied upon to communicate ‘something about 
something’ to someone; but could only distinguish itself from other parole in its own closed 
langue. At best, it could indicate that “I am speaking of ‘x’ and not ‘y’ (or any other) within 
‘langue a’”.   
In an effort to systematize knowledge of language, structuralism bracketed the sign from 
signified; deconstructionists realized (rightly) that a sign without a referent has no interpretable 
meaning. Thiselton notes that Patrick Grant finds a great contrast between “Augustine’s 
 
274 Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI, 2009), 116. 
275 F. de Saussure, as quoted by Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” 1977, 428. 
276 Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” 430 (Italics original). 
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representational view of language,277 and insistence in current literary theory that literary 
language undermines stable meanings. In Paul de Man’s terms, sign and meaning never 
coincide.”278 To recover the possibility of meaning for signs, Thiselton relies heavily on 
Wittgenstein’s conceptions of ‘language games’ from Philosophical Investigations and the Blue 
Book.  
The modern suspicion of the reliability of signs began in the Renaissance. Vanhoozer 
identifies it in Francis Bacon’s work. “It is all too easy, Bacon claims, to mistake one’s own 
definition of a word for knowledge of the thing to which the word refers. The problem is that 
people often use words in different ways, so words alone cannot reveal the nature of things.”279  
Augustine, in contrast, places signs themselves within his ontological framework, as a 
second classification of res. Augustine uses the term res in slightly different functions in his 
theory of word. In the general sense, the sign itself is also a res, as it is a thing that has Being and 
is sensible. A spoken word is heard, a gesture, letters on a page, and facial expressions are all 
things that an observer receives as sense data. In Augustine’s technical sense, the sign (signum) 
is a subset of res; the signum is properly a res, but has an additional function to indicate another 
res.  
 
277 In the understanding based on the preceding argumentation of this thesis, Augustine’s theory of language is not 
representational – though Thiselton’s sources seem to take this view. In the analysis of this current work, Augustine 
develops a referential linguistic theory. 
278 Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading, 506. 
279 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, 
1998, 39. 
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The category of sign is broken into two types. The first is a ‘natural sign’ (signa 
naturalia); this is a type that simply occurs, “apart from any intention or desire of using them as 
signs.”280  It is something in the natural world that specifically indicates something else.  One of 
Augustine’s examples of this is smoke, which indicates a fire below it.  Natural signs generally 
have a direct causal link to the res they indicate. To use Augustine’s example, a fire (res) is the 
direct cause of smoke (natural sign) which indicates the presence of the fire. There is no 
intentionality on the part of the fire to indicate to another its location or activity; smoke is caused 
naturally, whether another subject observes it at all.  
The second category, signa data, deals with signs that “living beings mutually exchange 
for the purpose of showing, as well as they can, the feelings of their minds,281 or their 
perceptions or their thoughts.”282  The category is wholly dependent on the intentionality of the 
utterer to indicate something to someone else. Most translators refer to these as ‘conventional’ 
signs which does make sense considering discussions of etymology such as Plato’s Cratylus.  B. 
Darrel Jackson, however, argues against this translation in favor of ‘given’ or even ‘intentionally 
given’ signs.283  
 
280 Doc. chr. II.2. 
281 Latin, motus animi. 
282 Doc. chr. II.1.3. 
283 Jackson, “The Theory of Signs in St. Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana,” 14. 
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Jackson supports this in two ways. First, it is simply a better translation of the Latin 
‘data’284 which means ‘given’.  Second, in the context of semantics, ‘convention’ applies more 
to meaning than occurrence.285 In the Cratylus, Plato discusses the difference between natural 
origin, and a conventional meaning of words. Here ‘natural’ refers to the Stoic idea that words 
are derived directly from the object indicated.  ‘Conventional’ source of meaning indicates that 
words are arbitrarily assigned to indicate objects by a linguistic culture that has agreed to its 
common understanding, but words are not inherently derived from the objects themselves.  
In Doc. chr. II, as well as in De dialectica, Augustine is not discussing the meaning of 
individual words or their etymology but the categorical distinctions of signifiers; primary at this 
juncture, is the issue of intentionality in use. For these signs, the essential characteristic is that 
they are intentionally used by an ‘utterer’ as an indication of a res – they are ‘given’ in reference 
to something. 
‘Given signs’, are further divided into two categories. Augustine does not go into detail 
on the first, which he refers to as “visible words.”286 These are gestures, such as a nod of the 
head to indicate assent, or military flags to signal troop movement. This category is not where his 
primary interest lies, either in De dialectica or Doc. chr.   
 
284 Latin datum. 
285 Jackson, “The Theory of Signs in St. Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana,” 14. 
286 Doc. chr. II.3.4. 
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“For among men words have obtained far and away the chief place as a means of 
indicating the thoughts of the mind.”287 Here we enter into the second major technical term in 
Augustine’s schema–verbum. Verbum (‘word’) occupies the focus of much of Augustine’s 
thought semantically, practically, and theologically. Verbum consists of only “articulate 
utterences”288 Utterances are formed by ‘letters’ –or better translated as ‘phonemes.’ By ‘letters’ 
Augustine means “the smallest part of an articulate utterance”289 Only spoken utterances are 
‘verbum’; a written word is only a visible sign indicating a word/utterance, hence the preference 
for keeping the ontological priority on the spoken aspect of words, even as the practical emphasis 
shifts to correctly interpreting the written word. 
It is important to note here, that for Augustine’s context, the written word was a 
secondary medium.  A millennium before Gutenberg’s printing press, writing, reproducing and 
distributing written material was a laborious affair, thus expensive, and not readily accessible. In 
addition there was no standard for spacing between words or lines, and no punctuation. Texts 
were essentially written phonetic recording of vocalizations. Even for those with access to texts, 
their first exposure to them would have been hearing them, as they were read aloud. “The ancient 
reader’s first acquaintance with style, genre, and subject matter occurred when he or she listened 
to the vocal modulations of the text as the words were pronounced.”290 There was no punctuation 
 
287 Doc. chr. II.3.4. 
288 De dialectica V.7. 
289 De dialectica V.7. 
290 Brian Stock, Augustine the Reader; Meditiation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 1996), 5. 
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or “’grammar of legibility’”291 for these early written formats. Memory played an important role 
in reading; for, as one read (whether aloud for others, aloud to oneself, or less commonly – 
silently), the reader would recall hearing the text being read aloud before. This memory would 
aid in parsing the written text into words, phrases and passages as they were read. The reader 
would have to sound out the words, syllable by syllable to decipher passages. Reading in late 
antiquity, even privately, was a still a vocal endeavor.292 
There are several ways in which Augustine views verbum. The first is that of the word 
itself, such as when the meaning of a word is being discussed.  This is the verbum proper–the 
actual phoneme/letter combination that constitutes a sign. The verbum itself, its constitution, its 
etymology, and its usage are not critically important.  These issues fall into the discipline of 
‘grammarians’; Augustine does not entirely dismiss it but devotes little space to the issue 
himself.  
In De dialectica VII, he considers briefly a somewhat mediating position between the 
natural and conventional source of signification. In natural signification, the sign derives directly 
from the res itself. The Stoics believed that “there is no word whose definite origin cannot be 
 
291 As quoted by Stock, 5. 
292 Contemporary research confirms this understanding of the relationship between spoken and written language. 
Human beings are ‘hardwired’ for spoken language, but reading is best taught by relating the sounds of words to the 
written symbols.  Recent publications have analyzed the results from the National Reading Panel (2000); cf The 
MIT Press, “Early Reading Instruction,” The MIT Press, accessed September 14, 2018, 
https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/early-reading-instruction. “McGuinness shows that all writing systems, without 
exception, are based on a sound unit in the language.” 
104 
 
explained;”293 they propose that any word can be traced back through its individual constituents 
until an “impression on the senses by the sounds are, as it were, the cradle of words.” 294 
Augustine agrees with Cicero’s mockery of this Stoic position. He does, however, suggest that 
onomatopoeia is the only category that possibly meets this natural criterion. The “‘clang’ of 
bronze,” or “‘bleating’ of sheep,” could be examples that seem to support the natural origination 
of the sign.  
Other types of words, as sounds, seem to trigger a sensory response commensurate with 
the object itself; Augustine plays with different words and their effect on the ear.  He seems, in 
particular, to find the ‘v’ sound, as well as the ‘x’, harsh.  He lists ‘crux’ (cross) as an example of 
phonetic un-pleasantness “because the harshness of the word itself agrees with the harshness of 
the pain which the cross produces.”295 In De dialectica, Augustine proposes that some words, in 
and of themselves, reflect the object they signify; however, he quickly moves on.  Augustine 
does seem to recognize that seeking the natural basis of words falls into an infinite regression of 
subjective associations.   
He is clear that the true force of words is rooted in our cognitive response to the signified 
res – not the sign itself.296 He dismisses seeking the primordial roots of signs as well as sounds 
 
293 De dialectica, V.9. 
294 De dialectica, V.9. 
295 De dialectica, V.9. 
296 In this view, Augustine pre-figures later speech-act theory. The locution itself is only a tool with which ‘to do 
something’. “The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, …but 
rather…the performance of a speech-act.” Searle, as quoted by Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 291. 
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of words imitating the sense of the res. In his later Doc. chr., he has clearly abandoned any 
natural position altogether in favor of strict signification by convention.   
For the sound of those two syllables [Deus (God)] in itself conveys no true 
knowledge of His nature; but yet all who know the Latin tongue are led, when that 
sound reaches their ears, to think of a nature supreme in excellence and eternal in 
existence.297  
Here, the word Deus derives its meaning from two things; first a linguistic community 
that recognizes the sound as indicating something, and second, that ‘something’ has attributes in 
and of itself that can be identified and recalled upon hearing the sound.  The properties of the 
sign itself do not influence the nature of the signified. For after all, the same sound may signify 
something else entirely in another language; “…certain letters and sounds mean one thing to the 
Latins, another to the Greeks, not because of nature but because each society has its own 
agreement and consent as to their significance.”298 This complex inter-language issue is 
mentioned briefly in De dialectica X, and Augustine specifically discusses many implications of 
interpretation across different languages in Doc. chr. II.     
Augustine’s theory of word, while comprehensive, thus far is not entirely original. It was 
developed in conversation with sources such as the Stoics, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. His 
contribution is in his analysis, evaluation, and deliberate parsing of the issue. 
 
297 Doc. chr. I.4.6 
298 Jackson, “The Theory of Signs in St. Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana,” 14. 
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Signification and Knowledge 
In C. Acad., Augustine affirms tautological knowledge, but resists the Stoic reliance on 
perception. This position is an acceptable one for the rhetorical purposes at hand, however, this 
cannot stand long-term in Augustine’s schema. For his philosophical-theological commitments, 
true knowledge must be accessible, and that access must come through signification as 
Augustine is unwilling to ascribe to the Stoic conception of phantasia kataleptike. For this to be 
reliable the relationship must be unbroken from the spiritual realm, as signified in the corporeal 
realm, as represented in verbum, and interpreted in the cognizing mind.  
 Cesalli and Germann299 find that Augustine develops the linguistic side of this theory in 
De dialectica and the ontological side in De musica. The res is, by nature of being, necessarily 
true, but how does that relate to linguistic expressions? Expressions as signa data are one of the 
entities in a triadic relationship with res and the observer. In order to be reliable, the two 
dimensions must be linked “on the one hand, the linguistic-semantic sphere, including the 
relationship between linguistic signs, their signification and truth; and on the other hand, the 
ontological sphere, embracing the connection between objects.”300  
 
299 Laurent Cesalli and Nadja Germann, “Signification and Truth Epistemology at the Crossroads of Semantics and 
Ontology in Augustine’s Early Philosophical Writings,” Vivarium 46, no. 2 (June 2008): 123–54, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/156853408X297679. 
300 Cesalli and Germann, 124. 
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This ontological relationship must be reliable to have the epistemic value that Augustine 
requires. To establish this connection, he returns to his example of unassailable knowledge in C. 
Acad., that of mathematics. The sensible world exists because it has numbers. The sky and the 
earth “have forms because they have numbers. Take these away, and nothing will be left.”301 
Augustine discussed this numerical basis of the corporeal in several writings302 though modern 
scholarship has largely overlooked its implications for hermeneutics. 
Though the philosophical relevance of this text has long been recognized and 
though it has formed the object of several studies – mainly from an aesthetic 
perspective – its implications with respect to Augustine’s theory of signs and 
signification are generally neglected, cf., for example, Hentschel’s “Einleitung” 
where he emphasizes the epistemological as well as the theological implications 
… but does not draw a connection to Augustine’s concept of signification. Even 
in Keller’s thorough study this aspect is absent.303 
 This numerical basis of the ontology of objects “is to be grasped as the means for laying 
bare the fixed and universal structure of the universe, beyond the characteristics of the world of 
appearance.”304 Music, for example, as an acoustic phenomenon, “is not subject to the limitations 
and particularities of arbitrary appearances as is, for instance language, but follows universally-
valid laws.”305 These universal laws govern all entities, motion, and reality in general.  
Augustine famously incorporates Plato’s realism into the Christian tradition by 
positioning mathematical object (and other Forms) as ideas in the mind of God. 
 
301 Augustine, as quoted by Cesalli and Germann, 139. 
302 Cf. De libero Arbitrio, De musica, De ordine.   
303 Cesalli and Germann, “Signification and Truth Epistemology at the Crossroads of Semantics and Ontology in 
Augustine’s Early Philosophical Writings,” 139. 
304 Cesalli and Germann, 140. 
305 Cesalli and Germann, 141. 
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They are included somehow in the Logos, … Thus mathematical objects remain 
eternal, necessary, and mind-independent… but they are now directly connected 
to God himself. …Since God creates precisely by means of the Word (John 1.3), 
this approach maintains what we might call the “ontological flow” … the creative 
energy from eternal, unchanging realities to the impermanent mundane realities of 
our world. 306 
Augustine distinguishes different types of numbers from the physical level (numeri 
corporales) to the level of human intellection (numeri iudiciales). At each level, a judgment must 
be made as to the agreement/disagreement with the universal laws of mathematics.307 For 
example, the role of numeri sensuales is to judge whether a perception of motion is proportionate 
with mathematical laws of motion. This judgment, because of its numerical basis, is ‘quasi-
rational’, and is the intersection of the sensible and the intelligible. The ability to make this 
rational, mathematical judgment is humankind’s “natural gift, [his/her] iudicium naturale, the 
bridge between sensorily-perceptible things and intellectual knowledge.”308 
The basis of this mathematic structure is the divine order – thus Augustine can proclaim: 
But what is superior except that in which the highest, unshakeable, unchangeable, 
eternal equality exists, where there is no time, because there is no change, and 
from which the times are created and set in order and modified in imitation of 
eternity, while the celestial rotation returns to the same place and recalls the 
celestial bodies to the same place and through the days and months and years and 
 
306 Steven D. Boyer and Walter B. Huddell, “Mathematical Knowledge and Divine Mystery: Augustine and His 
Contemporary Challengers,” Christian Scholar’s Review; 44, no. 3 (2015): 208. 
307 Augustine makes “unparalleled use” of the number-theories of both Pythagoras and Plato. An evaluation of this 
was made by Hentschel (Einleitung), cited by Cesalli and Germann. 
308 Cesalli and Germann, “Signification and Truth Epistemology at the Crossroads of Semantics and Ontology in 
Augustine’s Early Philosophical Writings,” 145. 
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lustra and the other orbits of the stars obeys the laws of equality and unity and 
order?309 
All created objects owe their ontology to this framework, and as such can be “recognized 
by the likewise mathematically structured human ratio in its proportionality.”310 This rational 
perception allows for access to things as they are.311 The numerical basis of objects allows an 
interpreter to develop knowledge beyond simple sense perceptions by observing the underlying 
rational cause, But how does this numeric perception relate to semantic reliability? 
 In the semantic sphere, Augustine works to provide a causal chain between the res, the 
sign and the observer – much like the causal relationship found in the signa naturalia. A word is 
perceived in two different ways; first as a word/sound it is sensible, and second as word/content 
(dicibile) it is intelligible. In Mag., an object perceived by sense-data is termed ‘sensibilia,’ and 
that perceived by the mind ‘intelligibilia.’312  This intelligible content is the perception of the 
mind of the content of word and its relationship to the ‘extra-mental’ object it signifies. Thus, the 
word ‘arbor’ makes an intelligible impression on the mind, much the same as an actual tree 
makes sensible impressions on physical senses. An important distinction is made here. Whereas 
the impressions of the tree constitute a representation in the Stoic (as well as the modern 
representationalist sense); the verbum constitutes a signification – a different genus of knowledge 
 
309 Augustine, as quoted by Cesalli and Germann, 147. 
310 Cesalli and Germann, 147. 
311 This argument is developed by Cesalli and Germann using primarily three sources: Aurelius Augustinus, De 
musica liber VI, trans. and ed. Martin Jacobsson, (Stockholm, 2002); A. Keller, Aurelius Augustinus and die Musik. 
Untersuchungen zu „De musica“ im Kontext seines Schrifttums (Würzburg, 1993); and Aurelius Augustinus, De 
musica. Bücher i und vi. Ed. F. Hentschel, (Hamburg, 2002).  
311 Cesalli and Germann, 147. 
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for Augustine. Intelligibility constitutes knowledge, whereas sense perception is simply 
information. The interplay of this relationship provides a space for an intermediate domain, that 
of linguistic expressions which can be reliable in signification of ontic truth. 
The connection between Augustine’s conception of numerical ontology and the truth 
value of natural signification must be established in order to be reliable. As a subset of signa 
naturalia, a recurring category of vestigia is developed. The vestigia are the properties of 
numbers that appear readily to the senses of an observer. “Those mathematical structures which 
men are able to recognize in all motions – discrete and continuous, spatial and temporal – are 
precisely the vestigia inherent in things. Since these vestiges concern “physical numbers”, they 
signify corresponding ‘immaterial numbers.’”313 These vestiges signal the mathematical structure 
that constitutes the res and adopt the function of a semantic indicator.314 This indicator refers to 
the immaterial levels of the numeri enabling cognition of the underlying principle and structure 
(the summa aequalitas, identified with the Creator) of an object. 
   Cesalli and Germann propose that Augustine develops the following conception of 
knowledge from ontology through signification: 
1. Knowledge is possible – if not probable (C. Acad.) 
2. There is a perceptible order to the physical (extra-mental) world (De ordine) 
 
313 Cesalli and Germann, “Signification and Truth Epistemology at the Crossroads of Semantics and Ontology in 
Augustine’s Early Philosophical Writings,” 148. 
314 Highlighting the common attributes of signa naturalia may be helpful here. Like smoke to fire, ‘vestiges’ are 
caused by the inherent ‘numerical’ patterns in the created order. An observer can see the sign and interpret the cause. 
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3. This ontological structure is numerically based (numeri corporales), and indicates the 
ultimate principle – God (De musica) 
4. Vestiges of this underlying structure are perceptible to the intentional human observer 
(De musica) 
5. Vestiges correspond to the numerical levels of intellection (numeri iudiciales) 
6. Correspondence is evaluated by the ratio and judged according to its adherence to 
mathematical structure of knowledge and reality 
7. Judged correspondence is then carried by a linguistic sign carrying the semantic 
content 315 
“What we have here is a symmetrical model, within which epistemology is described in 
terms of linguistic and metaphysical component: the model involves a linguistic-semantic side 
and an ontological one, the accuracy of human knowledge being founded on the isomorphism 
existing between words as signs of things, and things as signs of their ontological truth.”316 In the 
center of it all is the Incarnate Christ as Logos; Christ is the Word, present at creation,317 Christ is 
also the mathematical/rational basis of creation disclosing itself to the ratio of the finite human 
observer. 
 
315 This interpretation of Augustine’s theory of truth and signification (especially as it relates to De Musica) is 
unique to Cesalli and Germann. Anglophones have had a limited interest in De Musica except as it relates to 
aesthetics. An English translation of De Musica itself, has proven difficult to obtain. There has been much more 
work on this text and topic by scholars in German, Latin, and Spanish.  
316 Cesalli and Germann, “Signification and Truth Epistemology at the Crossroads of Semantics and Ontology in 
Augustine’s Early Philosophical Writings,” 153. 
317 John 1.1-5. 
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The Reliability of Given Signs 
According to Augustine’s definition,318 a ‘natural sign’ has a direct causal relationship to the res, 
which is its referent. The ontology of the sign is contingent on the ontology of the signified. The 
vestiges of the smoke directly correlate to the vestiges of fire. An observer perceives the vestiges 
in smoke and understands that there is a fire. In the genus ‘natural sign’, this direct relationship is 
obvious because of the intentional design of the Creator Himself. This relationship in connection 
to conventional sign requires further development because of its dependency on fallible human 
agreement.  
Even in the Augustine’s category of signa data, he has utmost confidence in its 
reliability. He subscribes to the belief that language is shown to be normatively reliable and that 
error is the exception. This exception is not negligible, it is a real possibility, therefore, care must 
be taken to critically evaluate communication, both spoken and written. Identification and 
correction of miscommunication is his central objective in Doc chr. 
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5. Ethics of Hermeneutics  
After establishing the relationship between the ontology of the res and function of its sign, 
Augustine next moves to its content (decibile). For there is no reason for using a sign “except the 
desire of drawing forth and conveying into another’s mind what the giver of the sign has in his 
own mind.”319  Moving into this next argument, Augustine drops the distinction between res and 
sign.  The sign is simply a species of res, “that which bears on the senses”.320   It should be 
noted, that Augustine does not subscribe to what has been termed ‘immediacy’ by 
deconstructionists. He recognizes that there is a distance between speaker/writer and hearer/ 
reader. “But since we do not clearly see what the actual thought is which the several translators 
endeavor to express,”321 it is necessary to use signs to convey the desired content, as well as an 
interpretive framework to understand the meaning of these signs. If there is no author, there is no 
mind seeking to share its contents, without these intended contents, the meaning of signs is 
indeterminate and relative. This is the process that Kevin Vanhoozer seeks to defend from the 
nihilism of deconstruction by ‘reviving’ the author. 
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Re-establishing the Author as ‘Other’ 
Indetermination and relativity in hermeneutics are not only a philosophical problem, but a 
theological one for Kevin Vanhoozer (and Augustine). He began his study of hermeneutics out 
of a desire to “clarify the role of Scripture in theology.”322 What he found, was that the question 
of interpretation is far larger in scope than the biblical studies. Vanhoozer became concerned that 
cultural issues were the drivers for many hermeneutic struggles in theology; “Instead of a book 
on biblical interpretation, therefore, I have written a theology of interpretation.” 323  The product 
of this effort was entitled Is there a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, the Reader, and the 
Morality of Literary Knowledge and is, for the most part, a conversation with deconstructionists 
such as Jacques Derrida. In this conversation, Vanhoozer attempts to respond to the degenerative 
effect that deconstruction and literary criticism have on the ability of hermeneutics in general, 
and specifically biblical theology, to generate meaning. 
Vanhoozer begins his hermeneutics project with the position developed by E.D. Hirsch. 
His book, Validity in Interpretation, defends the role of authorial intention in determining 
meaning.  He seeks to refute the “theory of authorial irrelevance” that had taken hold because of 
“academic skepticism and disarray”.324 In response to hermeneutic psychologizing and 
romanticism, literary critics determined that the empirical author was lost to the reader. They had 
 
322 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, 9. 
323 Vanhoozer, 9. 
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focused on their own particular “reading” of a text and had disassociated the author from 
meaning altogether.  “For once the author had been ruthlessly banished as the determiner of his 
text’s meaning, it very gradually appeared that no adequate principle existed for judging the 
validity of an interpretation.”325   
Hirsch’s approach to authorial intent is distinct from the psychological approach of 
Schleiermacher or Romanticism. He presents a “more technical, philosophical sense, appealing 
in particular to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Intentionality means that human 
consciousness is always about, or directed at, something.”326 In an act of communication the 
author “wills to convey something by a particular sequence of signs.”327 This sequence of signs 
is not simply a subjective mental act by author and reader, but an object of conscious 
intentionality shared between the two. 
The purpose of hermeneutics is to recover the intended meaning of a text, despite 
differences of situatedness. “An interpreter grasps the meaning of a text when he or she 
experiences sameness of content (or object) despite differentness of context.”328  For Hirsch, this 
‘sameness’ counters the possibility for two horizons of meaning.  
This theory of a changing meaning serves to support the fusion of 
interpretation…and the idea that present relevance forms the basis for textual 
 
325 E.D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 3. 
326 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, 
1998, 75. 
327 Vanhoozer, 76. 
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commentary.  [However] there could be no objective knowledge about texts. 
…even temporary validity could not be tested, since there would be no permanent 
norms on which validating judgments could be based.329 
 Texts cannot have a life of their own, their meaning is fixed at the time the author 
assembles the sequence of signs. “The author enjoys authority because conscious intention, not 
the range of possible dictionary definitions, is the source of stable meaning. The correct 
interpretation is the one that apprehends the author’s intended meaning.”330 Vanhoozer does not 
wholly subscribe to Hirsch’s schema, but does embrace his desire to rescue the author’s role in 
creating meaning.   
Vanhoozer breaks the linguistic skeptics, philosophers, critics, and theoreticians that have 
upended meaning, into two different categories, the Undoers and the Users.  Those that seek to 
deconstruct assumptions, traditions, philosophies and understandings he calls the ‘undoers’.  The 
pragmatists he calls the ‘users’.  Vanhoozer groups both of these under the category of 
unbelievers for their resistance to anything stable, concrete or determinative.  It is Vanhoozer’s 
goal to re-establish the possibility and morality of meaning in the post-modern environment. 
Vanhoozer’s prime example of an ‘undoer’ is Jacques Derrida, he becomes the primary 
interlocutor for deconstructionists. “For Derrida, deconstruction draws on the word of differance 
 
329 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 212. 
330 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, 
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[sic] in constituting the meaning of a text.”331 Whereas Wittgenstein utilized structuralism as a 
framework for analysis, for Derrida, différance was the ontic nature of language. Derrida adds a 
second dimension to the différance of Saussure. The French word means both ‘difference’ 
(opposition), and to ‘defer’ (delay). Thus, his new term, différance, encompasses both aspects of 
his isolation of sign; the synchronic conception of structuralist langue, and the diachronic 
dependence on future use to continue to have possible meaning.  
Meaning is never intrinsic to a sign, there are only signs endlessly delaying the presence 
of the reality beyond. “’Meaning’ is the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow of reading, which 
continually recedes as one approaches it. We never know what a sign is a sign of; when we go to 
the dictionary we only find other signs.”332 The original referent is obscured rather than indicated 
by language.  
The ultimate goal for Derrida is to hold language to account, and expose the logocentric 
obsession of philosophy as an attempt to reduce and master Being, rather than to disclose it as it 
is. Derrida finds that western philosophy went wrong when Plato surmised a “realm of truth – the 
eternal Forms – to which reason has direct access without having to go through language.”333 
Though Derrida begins with the phenomenology of Husserl,334 he attempts to objectively 
 
331 Thomas Baldwin, “Derrida,” in Philosophy of Language, ed. Barry Lee, Key Thinkers (London: Continuum 
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establish self-consciousness without resorting to using signs. The ideal knowledge is based on “a 
subject’s self-presence in a silent and intuitive consciousness”.335  
Derrida himself, questions the possibility of the ‘silent subject’. He expresses that self-
consciousness, ideally, could be found as a ‘relation to oneself’.  This ‘relation’ implies 
something of an ‘other’ – a dialogical partner of sorts. This interlocutor must disclose 
consciousness “by using concepts which belong within a language that is not exclusively our 
own here and now (and is therefore ‘different from oneself’)”336 Derrida seems to be attempting 
to propose an objective epistemology and discard signification. Derrida even refutes Husserl’s 
conception of ‘reactivation’; Husserl proposes that a given sign causes the observer of the sign to 
recall previous experiences with the concept. “Derrida, however, does not take over this thesis; 
on the contrary he holds that past experiences cannot be brought back to life at all.”337 Unable to 
conceive of such a linguistically devoid, knowing subject, he proposes a mysterious interlocutor 
that does not have the same linguistic presuppositions. How he conceives that these two 
imaginary subjects would transfer this knowledge without participating, at least on some level, in 
a language-game is unclear. 
Vanhoozer interprets Derrida as an expansion of the Kantian reflection on the ‘death of 
God’ and its implications on knowledge. “Yet he sees further than Kant in perceiving that the 
 
335 Derrida, as quoted by Baldwin, “Derrida,” 278. 
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loss of God leads to the loss of the knowing subject (the hero of modernity) as well. Derrida has 
correctly analyzed the modern situation, or at least an aspect of it.”338 Whatever the 
understanding (they are varied) of Derrida’s project, he states his desire “…to make enigmatic 
what one thinks one understands by the words ‘proximity’, ‘immediacy’, ‘presence’ … [this] is 
my final intention in this book. This deconstruction of presence accomplishes itself through the 
deconstruction of consciousness,”339 
Baldwin, like Vanhoozer, also interprets Derrida in a Kantian light; the goal of 
deconstruction is to establish that the possibility of meaning in language is because of a 
‘movement of differance’. Baldwin also recognizes that some (i.e. Richard Rorty340) interpret On 
Grammatology “as propounding a quietest message, to the effect that there cannot be a 
substantial philosophy of language at all.”341 Whether Derrida simply desires to point out the 
flaw in assuming that language works, or wishes to abolish the grounds of functional language, is 
a topic for debate. What is clear is that he views language as a construct of a ‘metaphysics of 
presence’ which must be discarded if humanity is to confront Being again. 
Refuting this ‘presence’ is the core of Derrida’s deconstruction. “In On Grammatology he 
remarks that the ‘axial proposition of this essay’ is that ‘there is nothing outside the text’”342 This 
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slogan has been interpreted two ways – much to Derrida’s frustration. Some have mistaken this 
statement as a declaration that the text is all that exists, that language is ontology. There can be 
no existence beyond the word. The New Hermeneutic comes close to adopting this linguistic 
idealism. Derrida himself affirmed that his statement is not a statement about idealism, but about 
the isolation of a text from external referent; “That there is no reference or meaning ‘outside the 
text’, outside the play of difference, for example, by means of the bare presence of an object or 
meaning to consciousness.”343 Signs are only signs in opposition to other signs, at no point do 
they point outside of themselves and the linguistic system to which they belong. The only 
context is the text itself. 
This has dramatic implications for the author of a text. If, as deconstruction insists, the 
text renders all context inaccessible, the author, her/his intention, and the content of the locution 
is lost. This issue is the focus of the first section of Vanhoozer’s book Is there a Meaning in this 
Text? He objects to this removal of the author from text for two reasons; first, ontologically a text 
would not exist without an author to create it, and second, the fate of the author is the textual 
equivalent of the Creator for theology. He finds a connection between the role of an author and a 
creator.  
The parallel between God and the author is again instructive. … the meaning of 
the world has been inscribed by the hand of the Creator. It is God who originates 
the world, who upholds it, and who preserves the distinctions that give it meaning. 
God is the Author of authors…344 
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 Thus, the existence, function, and authority of the author take primacy of place in 
Vanhoozer’s hermeneutic efforts. He finds that the two disciplines, theology and hermeneutics, 
have much in common. “The sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth. The age of 
the sign is essentially theological”345 Thus the undoing of the sign, is an attempt at undoing God 
(or god). Deconstructionists believe that western philosophy has deluded itself (and others) into 
replacing Being with a linguistically mediated illusion of the transcendence. “To believe in 
transcendence … is to fall under the illusion of the reliability of the sign. Philosophers who 
perpetuate this illusion are only ventriloquists who project their own voices onto ‘Being’ or 
‘Reason.’ By contrast, Derrida’s analysis overthrows this first ‘idol’ of the sign.”346 
 The author of a text cannot exist for deconstructionists, because ‘there is nothing outside 
the text’. Furthermore, even if the author was accessible, the text hides true being. As Vanhoozer 
writes about his own text: Derrida “would insist, first, that my intentions and efforts are not 
sufficient to ground its meaning or to control its interpretation, and second, that what I have 
written is not my own voice so much as the voice of all the teachers and texts that have had an 
impact on me.” Logocentrism, for Derrida, displaces and defers the Being of the author. The 
inability to disclose the transcendent, renders God inaccessible as well as the author. For any use 
of sign is only a reference to other signs in a system of “socially constructed signifieds”.347  
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Vanhoozer determines that Derrida correctly estimates the predicament of modern 
systematic approaches to language and meaning, “but he has done so by bracketing out orthodox 
Christian beliefs. …the death of God that informs deconstruction is the death of the God of the 
philosophers, not of the God disclosed in Jesus Christ.”348 He sets out to make a case for the 
possibility of meaning, the authority of the author, and clarify the theological issues at stake. 
Vanhoozer seeks to counter “Four Intentional Fallacies” that, New Criticism349 and 
deconstruction have advanced regarding authorial intent:  
The “Fallacy of Relevancy” claims that the intent of the author is irrelevant to the 
meaning of a text. This fallacy states that author-oriented criticism confuses semantics with 
psychologizing. The text must stand on its own, analyzed by how language was actually used. 
These critics were formalists in that linguistic convention, and not intention, determined meaning 
– for after all the intention of the author is unknown and unknowable. Vanhoozer partly agrees; 
first, in that not all data about the author is relevant to interpretation. Certain facts are, however, 
necessary; facts such as the language and time period of the author give essential clues as to what 
linguistic context to use in understanding. Second, even an author’s declarations of intent are not 
entirely relevant, because there could be failure to realize them.350 
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The Fallacy of Transparency is a counterpoint to Hirsch’s belief that meaning is a matter 
of conscious intent. These critics tie the meaning of language to unconscious factors. This 
understanding of meaning has roots in Freudian psychology; Jacques Lacan found that the 
structure of language itself, is based on the unconscious. Michel Foucault identifies the ‘deep 
structure’ of language with the social context.351 Therefore, the very language an author uses to 
convey a message is colored by the unconscious influences of their social situatedness, in effect 
any communicative act is more of a by-product of the langue than an original parole. Not all 
meaning in a text is the conscious intention of the author, there are “unintended messages about 
the history and society in which the author lived.”352 Uncovering these hidden meanings is the 
priority of these interpreters. 
The Fallacy of Identity makes no distinction between the intention of the author and the 
actual language of the text. Vanhoozer identifies the Fallacy of Relevancy (above) as an 
epistemological error, and the Fallacy of Identity as an ontological error. The language of the 
text should be considered ontologically separate from the mental act that created it.  Ricoeur 
refers to this as “semantic autonomy”, at some point the event of writing becomes separated from 
the life of the text.353   
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The Fallacy of Objectivity counters the claims of objectivity by hermeneutic realists. This 
fallacy is authored by “non-realists” influenced by the philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn. He 
argues that even scientific knowledge is simply the subjective understanding of the observer 
constructing reality.  A hermeneutic realist goes wrong from the outset by claiming that “the 
interpretive object has a real independence, that it stands over against the interpretive acts.”354  
Hermeneutic proposals cannot suggest an objective methodological system for determining 
meaning, because they necessarily rely on maintaining a delineation between a stable source of 
meaning (an ‘object’), and a changing occasion of significance by a subject.  
These four critiques of authorial intent have been offered by the New Criticism and 
deconstructionists. Vanhoozer, to varying degrees, holds them as valid opposition to modernist 
theory of meaning and the role of the author in the interpretive process. In light of these fallacies, 
his goal is to present a valid “appeal to the author’s intention [which] will henceforth have to 
show how it is not guilty of these errors.”355 
The first paragraph in Vanhoozer’s chapter “Resurrecting the Author: Meaning As 
Communicative Action” is a long quote from Augustine, “Conventional signs are those which 
living creatures show to one another for the purpose of conveying, in so far as they are able…”356 
He briefly contrasts Augustine’s approach to language to Derrida’s. Augustine conceives of 
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language as something to be used in order to achieve the highest good, the enjoyment of God. 
“The highest end of human beings is enjoying God. Language, when rightly used, is one of the 
chief means that lead to this joy.”357 Vanhoozer summarizes Derrida’s position by emphasizing 
his idea of language as ‘play’; “The advent of writing is the advent of this play.”358 Without ever 
pointing outside of itself, language is an object which people can rearrange in different patterns 
for their aesthetic pleasure. In Vanhoozer’s view, these two positions could not contrast more; 
one is a method of communion with God and other humans across space and time, the other is a 
postmodern conception of subjective pleasure and play.  
The resurrection of the author begins by framing language as a communicative act 
(meaning as action) rather than a static sign (meaning as object). Meaning is something that 
people do. In viewing language as an action, the analysis of what it is, and how it works, changes 
dramatically. Language as an action, requires that a network of relationships between objects, 
agents, causes, effects, intentions, and responses be considered fundamental to meaning. He 
appeals to the philosophy of ‘ordinary language” as a starting point. 
Ordinary Language as Action  
‘Ordinary language’ philosophers view language in its practical, everyday use. “Their motto, in 
direct opposition to Derrida’s, might well have been: ‘There is nothing (eg no utterance, no text) 
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outside a context.’”359  While opposing deconstructionists’ views, ordinary language theories 
also contradict modernist systems of meaning. The focus of meaning had been on words (in an 
individual sense), for ordinary language, the emphasis was at the level of sentence. Meaning was 
a product of how words functioned together, in the context in which they were used.  
An exemplar of this change in focus is Ludwig Wittgenstein; his thought took a dramatic 
‘linguistic turn’ from his early agreement with Bertrand Russell’s logical positivism, to the 
‘language games’ of his later Philosophical Investigations.360 The modern, scientistic approach 
was to bracket language from its context, and determine an objective “single logic that would 
relate language and reality”.361 Wittgenstein would later determine that the rules of language 
changed dramatically based on social context, subject matter, and purpose.  
J. L. Austin was another language philosopher that found that usage was the best way to 
study language.362 Syntax was a part of the langue but had a limited contribution to meaning. 
Rather than discuss the trueness or falseness of linguistic propositions, as had been the standard 
practice, Austin sought to analyze what speakers intended to do by making utterances. He 
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developed the three-fold division of linguistic use: locution, illocution, and perlocution. John 
Searle further classified the different types of speech-acts into five basic categories:  
“We tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to 
doing things, we express our feelings and attitudes and we bring about changes through our 
utterances. Often, we do more than one of these at once in the same utterance.”363 
Searle accuses Derrida of confusing types of utterances with “tokens”. Derrida declares 
that a statement cannot have definite meaning because the same words can be used in entirely 
different contexts to mean entirely different things. Searle defines the sentence ‘type’ as the 
word/grammar combination – the actual ‘text’ used. The ‘token’ of the utterance is the particular 
context that the type was uttered. “He’s hot” (type) could mean entirely unrelated things in 
different situations (tokens). It “could be a response to a forehand cross court, to someone’s 
temperature, or to someone’s angry outburst.”364 Simply because sentence types can be used in 
different tokens does not imply that their meaning is indeterminate, it simply indicates that the 
context of the utterance must be a factor in determining meaning. 
Searle makes a second important distinction, between epistemology and ontology. A lack 
of knowledge about something (i.e. an author’s intent) does not mean that such a thing does not 
exist. “The standard mistake is to suppose that a lack of evidence, that is, our ignorance, shows 
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indeterminacy or undecidability in principle”365 Deconstructionists make sweeping statements 
about the impossibility of meaning, but to make their case, they must apply modernist categorical 
limits and materialistic reductions. “We may call the poststructuralists reduction of sentences and 
speakers to elements in a differential sign system the ‘semiotic fallacy.’”366 By considering the 
tri-partite functions of language, particularly illocution, an intentional agent necessarily returns 
as a part of the communicative act. 
Vanhoozer’s next task is to make the connection between language as utterance and 
language as text; and while they are substantially different, the principles of ordinary language 
apply. To make this argument, he turns to Paul Ricoeur who, by Vanhoozer’s admission, is not 
an advocate of authorial intention. Ricoeur’s theory of discourse, nonetheless requires that it 
“does not alienate authors from readers but makes shared meaning possible. Indeed, it is 
humanity’s chief resource for overcoming spatial, temporal, and cultural distance.”367 While 
Vanhoozer prefers to maintain authorial intent as part of the meaning, Ricoeur moves intent to 
the ‘event’ of writing. An author writing a text is an event, similar to the event of a verbal 
discourse that passes away in time. The written text, however, continues through time and 
distance taking on new meaning(s) of its own as it is re-interpreted by new audiences. 
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Vanhoozer interprets, by implication, that authorial intent is core to Ricoeur’s analysis of 
the text. Ricoeur, however, develops this relationship far more subtly. He is careful not to sever 
the author from the text, this would fall into what he refers to as the “fallacy of the absolute 
text.”368 He places limits on the control of meaning by the empirical author. The intention of the 
author is placed under part of the ‘intention’ of the text. Vanhoozer finds that by analogy this is 
authorial intent, “We do not ascribe agency to texts. For only persons say something to someone 
about something.”369  
Perhaps the difference here is primary focus. Vanhoozer, as a systematic theologian 
interested in hermeneutics, is first concerned with the teleology of interpretation. Behind the text 
must be a fixed object on which to base a methodological theology. Ricoeur is a hermeneut who 
is interested in theology; as a result, he is more concerned with a description of the process of 
interpretation; following the life of the semantic projection of the text and its interaction with a 
reader/recipient.  
Augustine’s approach differs from both Vanhoozer and Ricoeur. Like Ricoeur, an author 
uses language to project an image of an object of interest. Ricoeur’s projection, however, stands 
between the author and the reader in a linear configuration. Augustine’s author is using language 
to indicate the actual object; the semantic projection is not a barrier between author and reader, it 
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stands on its own. As with theological hermeneutics, Augustine places the importance on the 
indicated object.  
 Augustine’s hermeneutic also contrasts to the theological hermeneutic proposed by 
Anthony Thiselton. In Thiselton’s (and Ricoeur’s) contemporary framework the author and text 
stand between the reader and the object, for Augustine, the author, reader, and object, are in 
triangle configuration with signs relaying on all three sides. The author and text are not an 
obstacle, but a guide, indicating and drawing the attention of the reader to an object that stands 
independently. Especially in the case of scriptural signification, the ontic priority of the signified 
outweighs the author, interpreter, and sign, according to Augustine’s Rule (above).  
Ethics of Authorship  
The next issue Vanhoozer addresses, is to clarify the type of the author he wishes to re-establish. 
He begins with a brief discussion of Descartes’ cogito. He identifies three problems that a 
Cartesian conception of humanity poses to hermeneutics. First, is that when the cogito is the 
starting point, it is difficult (if not impossible) to verify other minds. If other minds are difficult 
to establish ontologically, how accessible are their intentions?  
Second, making the ‘I’ the central (or lone) figure in anthropology leaves very little room 
for establishing the role of social convention. The ‘metaphysically independent society’ 
promotes humans to be disengaged from one another, Cartesian dualism promotes an 
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anthropological ‘atomism’.370 It is impossible to develop a comprehensive social theory, or a 
requisite theory of understanding when the concept of ‘other’ needs perpetual justification.  
Third, a subject/object dualism reduces the validity of social context for meaning. 
Language becomes a tool for a mind to name and manipulate objects and ideas. “Language, 
spoken or written, creates what Charles Taylor calls a public space.”371 This public space in 
which language really lives and works is counter to the interiority of the mind that justifies 
being.  
In response to these problems, Vanhoozer identifies four perspectives on authorial 
agency. The first, is that the author is a historical agent. Contrary to the Cartesian paradigm, an 
author is an embodied soul. Language is an extension of corporeality, a way for the mind and 
will to do things in the physical world. “The postmodern textualist is in danger of worshiping the 
play of signs. For one who believes in meaning, however, the text is a semantic sacrament that 
mediates the other: the author’s vision of the world, the testimony of the witness.”372 Here, 
Augustine would certainly agree, language is a tool “for the purpose of showing ... the feelings of 
their minds,”373 to another. Language is a way for one mind to extend its contents to another 
mind.  
 
370 Charles Taylor, as quoted by, Vanhoozer, 231. 
371 Vanhoozer, 231. 
372 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, 
229. 
373 Doc. chr. II.2.3. 
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In response to this type of author, a reader seeks to understand the mental content that the 
author intends. Vanhoozer and Augustine are in agreement again; “in reading it, men seek 
nothing more than to find out the thought and will of those by whom it was written”,374 and 
“Understanding the text involves determining what an author has done, for a text is a 
communicative action fixed by writing.”375 
Vanhoozer’s second perspective of the author is as an Aesthetic Agent. An author 
assembles a text out of available signs. It is the author who determines which words to use, how 
to arrange them, and what structure the text should take, to illicit the desired response from the 
audience. These are the form critical aspects of a text; Augustine, as a trained rhetorician, knew 
well, the importance of these choices. He discusses both the benefits and drawbacks of teaching 
rhetoric to interpreters in Doc. chr. IV.1-3. 
The third perspective is of the Author as an Ethical Agent. “By emphasizing the 
performative nature of language (i.e. language as action, as work, as something we do), [J.L.] 
Austin reminds us that we are responsible for everything we say,”376 So to, Augustine holds the 
ethical ramifications of speech as a vital component of language. An act of speech has the 
responsibility to indicate (properly) the ontology of the object; to carelessly or maliciously 
misrepresent the states of things and mislead the interpreter is a great moral failure (cf the 
 
374 Doc. chr. II.5.6. 
375 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, 
1998, 233. 
376 Vanhoozer, 235. 
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charges leveled at the skeptics in C. Acad. II) as well as a serious doctrinal error (cf Doc. chr. 
II.13, IV.4).   
The fourth perspective is the Author as Religious Agent. Vanhoozer perceives an element 
of faith and fidelity within the communicative act. “Unless there is something in what we say, we 
will never be able to witness to what is other than ourselves. And unless we are faithful to what 
we say, our witness will be null and void.”377 He relates this position to the first and third 
requirement of Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action. The first, communication must be 
true, that is, it accurately reflects the state of things; and the third, it must be appropriate for the 
social context. This religious aspect takes seriously the import for a speaker/writer to be 
accountable for that he or she communicates, for communicative action not only makes changes 
in the world, it effects who the utterer is, and becomes.  
To remove the author from the text, as postmodern literary theory has proposed, is to 
remove any sense of responsibility for the effects that a discourse would have on the world. If 
there is no responsible party for meaning, deconstructionists are correct; a reader will only see 
themselves, for they cannot trust the witness of the ‘other’, if indeed, there is an ‘other’ at all. In 
the case of faithful speech, the purpose is to point the way to the Wholly Other. “The rupture 
between the speaker and his words is the decisive break. If a person is not behind his words, it is 
mere noise.”378 Augustine too, affirms that the author must exercise some authority in 
 
377 Vanhoozer, 237. 
378 Jacques Ellul, The Humiliation of the Word (1985), as quoted by Vanhoozer, 237. 
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interpretation. “Whoever takes another meaning out of Scripture than the writer intended, goes 
astray, ...”379 The author is the originator of communication, and the reader is obligated to seek 
out the intended meaning. 
Ethics of Readership 
Vanhoozer must redeem one more agent in the hermeneutic process, the reader. “Literary 
knowledge is not a matter of disinterested factuality. Most authors do not write simply to convey 
information, but to affect their readers in some other way besides.”380 What is the obligation of a 
reader? Is there any? “Texts, like dead men and women, have no rights, no aims no interests. 
They can be used in whatever way readers or interpreters choose. If interpreters choose to respect 
an author’s intentions, that is because it is in their interest to do so.”381 If literary criticism and 
reader response theories are correct, it would follow that a reader has no moral responsibility in 
interpreting a text.  
There are, however, assumptions about social constructs that are implicitly made in 
taking this view. Language is the function of humanity that projects the contents of one mind to 
another. If this link is severed, the social function of a human being is severed as well. As 
Richard Rorty finds, human beings are “alone, merely finite, with no links to something 
 
379 Doc. chr. I.36.41. 
380 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, 
368. 
381 Robert Morgan, as quoted by Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the 
Morality of Literary Knowledge, 371. 
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beyond.”382 In this case a reader could only find themselves in a text, for there could be nothing 
or no one more.  
For those that accept that humans are necessarily social creatures, the moral ramifications 
of language and textual engagement must be considered. A text is a way to encounter an “other”, 
a fundamental requirement of social beings. Ricoeur finds that the act of an utterance both 
requires, and equates, to interlocution. “So, there is not illocution without allocution and, by 
implication, without someone to whom the message is addressed. …the statement is therefore 
straightaway a bipolar phenomenon: it implies simultaneously an ‘I’; that speaks and a “you” to 
whom the former addresses itself.”383  
Vanhoozer identifies three different types of reader – the user, the critic, and the follower. 
The ‘user’ views reading a text to be an amoral event, there is no good or bad reading. “There is 
nothing to be responsible to except historical communities.”384 This is, of course, highly relative 
to one’s own situation and community purposes. A text is simply a tool to use, in a utilitarian 
fashion, to advance one’s own goals.  
The ‘critic’ judges a text from the vantage point of their own ideology. Vanhoozer cites a 
great deal of difference between the ‘criticism’ of early modernity and the ‘critical’ stance of 
 
382 Richard Rorty, as quoted by Vanhoozer, 371. 
383 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 43. 
384 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, 
1998, 371. 
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post-modernity. Criticism was undertaken as “a descriptive pursuit, analyzing, explaining and 
codifying the questions that perceptive readers put to the text.”385 This is very different from the 
critical suspicion of post-modernity. Critics claim an ethical reading because they are concerned 
with their contemporary situation as well as the advancement of humanity. They approach the 
text from the perspective of an ideology and judge it based on how well it advances or counters 
their own ideological goals. “You must accept their implied conception of the good life if you 
are to accept their criticism. That is, you can admire them as critics only if you also revere them 
as sages.”386  
A ‘follower’ values the text as other, and allows a text to say what it will, as a 
communicative act. A follower will use critical thinking and its tools, not to dismantle or 
overpower a text, but to develop an understanding of the author’s intended illocution. Seeking to 
understand a text makes one a good, ethical reader, but scriptural texts require more than 
understanding, they require participation. A follower appropriates the perlocution of a text; 
allows the text not only to speak, but to become a dialogical agent that can confront and change 
the reader. 
This is the type of reader that Augustine seeks to develop in Doc. chr. The first step to 
wisdom is the “fear of God to seek the knowledge of His will, what He commands us to desire 
 
385 John Barton, Reading the Old Testament, 6, as quoted by Vanhoozer, 371f. 
386 C.S. Lewis, as quoted by Vanhoozer, 374. 
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and what to avoid.”387 The reader of scripture must submit themselves to the text, seeking the 
path to the love of God and neighbor. The second step to wisdom is “to have our hearts subdued 
by piety, and not to run in the face of Holy Scripture. …We must rather think and believe that 
whatever is there written, even though it be hidden, is better and truer than anything we could 
devise by our own wisdom.”388 A reader of scripture should emulate those who, recorded in 
them, “fear God and are of meek and pious disposition seek the will of God.”389 Augustine’s 
reader, like Vanhoozer’s and Ricoeur’s ‘struggles’ with the text, places the text as ‘wholly other’ 
and allows it to confront and conform them. 
Proper hermeneutics of scripture is only a means – not an end in itself. Scripture is not a 
res to be known but a sign to indicate something greater than itself. Augustine’s extended 
discussion of “Some things are for use, some for enjoyment”390 makes this position clear. For 
God alone is to be enjoyed as “eternal and unchangeable. The rest are for use that we may be 
able to arrive at the full enjoyment of the former.”391 This use includes scripture itself as a sign. 
There are qualifications for ‘use’ however, these qualifications are also ethical limits to the 
interpreted meaning of scripture itself.  
 
387 Doc. chr. II.7.9 
388 Doc. chr. II.7.9-10. 
389 Doc. chr. II.9.14. 
390 Doc. chr. I.3.3 – 22.20. 
391 Doc. chr. I.22.20. 
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Love as Horizon of Meaning 
Augustine balances knowledge with love. In Doc. chr., he quotes Paul three times in this 
connotation; “this knowledge puffs up, but love builds up.”392 Love is the hermeneutic key for 
Augustine, the ultimate end of scripture is love of God and love of neighbor. These are the 
‘things’ (res) of scripture, when they are mastered, the sign (scripture itself) is no longer needed. 
Love is the illocution of scripture, one “who is resting upon faith, hope and love, and who keeps 
a firm hold upon these, does not need the Scriptures except for the purpose of instructing 
others.”393 Love is also the perlocution of scripture, knowledge accompanies submission to the 
text. Knowledge cannot result in domination of the text, God, or neighbor; but only in love and 
care.   
The most important of these limits is love. Augustine identifies four different types of 
things that we are to love. The first (from Matthew 22:37) is the love of ‘that which is above us’ 
– namely the Godhead. The second love is proposed to be the self but with caveats. Firstly, that 
the love of self cannot overcome the other loves but must facilitate them; self-love must always 
be secondary to love of God as ‘higher,’ secondly, self-love must never “lord it even over those 
who are by nature its equals, – that is, its fellow-men, [sic] – this is a reach of arrogance utterly 
intolerable.”394  Self-love, thirdly requires self-care but prioritizing ‘spirit’ over ‘body’, and 
 
392 I Corinthians 8.1 (ESV) quoted II.41.62. I Corinthians 13.8, “Love never ends… knowledge will pass away” 
quoted, I.39.43. I Corinthians 13.13 “Faith, hope and love, abide…” quoted I.40.44. 
393 Doc. Chr. I.30.40. 
394 Doc. chr. I.23.22. 
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carefully weighing possible gains regarding self-sacrifice. Augustine’s third ‘love’ is the love of 
that which is equal to the self, namely one’s neighbor (also cited from Matthew 22:37). The 
fourth love is “that which is beneath us,”395 which Augustine makes no comment on. 
These four loves encompass possible meanings of the signs of scripture. “This is the sum: 
that we should clearly understand that the fulfillment and the end of the Law, and of all Holy 
Scripture, is the love of an object which is to be enjoyed, and the love of an object which can 
enjoy that other in fellowship with ourselves.”396 For Augustine, the meaning of scripture refers 
to “faith, hope and charity,” and the “end of the of commandment is charity”.397  
This ‘charity’ has two implications: first as an ethical virtue, second as a hermeneutic 
one. It is this hermeneutic value that Vanhoozer wishes to restore to hermeneutics in the post-
modern era. “With regard to the morality of literary understanding, Augustine advocates what is 
for him the prime hermeneutical virtue, namely, charity. This is a far cry from the typical modern 
approach that puts a premium on distrust and suspicion.”398 
  
 
395 Doc. chr. I.23.22 
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397 1 Timothy 1:5 quoted by Augustine, Doc. chr. I. 
398 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has shown that Augustine’s understanding and development of the interrelationship 
of ontology, epistemology, and hermeneutics is far from simplistic and naïve. His inherited 
hermeneutic framework was not the stereotype of ‘allegorical’ as arbitrary spiritual meaning. It 
was a rich, complex, and nuanced interpretive tradition that employed critical methodologies to 
texts. The teleology of these practices was different than those of modernity.  Whereas the 
modern (and post-modern) hermeneut seeks to reconstruct the historical events behind the text, 
for the Alexandrians and Antiochenes the purpose of interpretation was to discover Divine Truth 
as disclosed through history.  
Constructive post-modern philosophers have adopted significant points of development 
from the thought of Augustine. Heidegger’s work to overcome the subject/object divide through 
Dasein explicitly references, and arguably is rooted in, Augustinian concepts. Gadamer finds in 
Augustine an exemplar for reaching to the very edges of the possibility of language to disclose – 
without becoming domineering or deterministic of Being. In his writing, the best of descriptive 
theories of language, understanding and meaning, are reflected. The core tenets of speech-act 
theory, and the contextual implications of language-games can be found already in his analysis 
of communication.  
Not only does Augustine anticipate the challenges of postmodern theological 
hermeneutics, such as Anthony Thiselton’s theoretical developments, he also shares Vanhoozer’s 
moral concerns about interpretation. These premodern and postmodern authors are cognizant of 
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issues of ‘literary knowledge’ such as an approach to the text as ‘other’. Both exhort readers to 
adopt a posture of humility; and to resist the impulse to dominate the text.   
Augustine also resolves some issues that are left open in contemporary discussions. 
Thiselton, in his hermeneutic endeavors, never really addresses the problem of how language and 
Being relate. He is never able to bring Ricoeur’s “place where language is saying”399 to anchor 
within a semantic horizon. Augustine’s robust theory of reference offers a ‘place to say’ and 
allows for the ‘possibilities’ of meaning at the level of discourse. 
Augustine extends the later literary morals of Vanhoozer into social ethics and religious 
praxis. In the interpretation of the locution (of scripture), the call to love is both the illocution 
(hermeneutical aspect), and the perlocution (ethical aspect). This is a holistic approach, allowing 
for the theoretical complexities of language and interpretation of the ‘philosopher’, the ‘clarity of 
scripture’ for the ‘mass’, and the praxis of discipleship for all.  
More importantly, Augustine addresses the possibility of meaning. Theological 
hermeneutics is primarily concerned with the content of meaning. Their concern with 
interpretation carries an implicit ‘understanding according to’; i.e. the proper interpretation of the 
text is one that rightly defines the content of proclamation. Augustine, however, understood that 
 
399 Ricoeur, as quoted by Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical 
Description, 1980, 121. 
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skepticism, and its resultant relativism, reduced any proclamation to one more proposition in a 
field of equipollence.  
Vanhoozer identifies this problem in terms of textual hermeneutics, and he issues a plea 
for the return to intersubjective morality to correct it. Augustine understood that the issue of 
morality was prior to that of interpretation. In a culture where all things are indeterminate, ethics 
are also relative – including the ethics of interpretation. It is not coincidence that his first writing 
project as a Christian was to establish the possibility of, as well as the moral imperative to seek, 
knowledge itself.  
Augustine not only addresses theoretical and moral concerns, but also offers an anchor on 
which to rest hermeneutics which contemporary theologians stop short of providing. In the book 
Reading Texts, Seeking Wisdom, all the contributing authors place wisdom within the framework 
of the interpretive act. The first two essays of the compilation, by David Ford and Robert 
Morgan, (both entitled “Jesus Christ, the Wisdom of God”), discuss the topic from a textual-
critical and exegetical viewpoint. Ford concludes his essay, “I am acutely aware that I have 
discussed the topic of ‘Jesus Christ the Wisdom of God’ with no direct exploration of what 
wisdom in God might be.”400 He then invokes De trinitate XV, and agrees with Augustine, that 
Christian interpretation finds its “distinctive fulfilment” in the love of wisdom.401 Morna Hooker, 
of all the contributing authors in this project, comes the closest to the idea of Christ as Wisdom. 
 
400 Ford, David E., “Jesus Christ, the Wisdom of God (I),” in Reading Texts, Seeking Wisdom, ed. David E. Ford and 
Graham Stanton (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 21. 
401 Ford, David E., “Jesus Christ, the Wisdom of God (I),” 21. 
143 
 
She finds, in I Corinthians 1.24, that “Paul identifies Christ with the wisdom of God, … in the 
significance of the message of Christ crucified”.402 She cites this passage however, already 
couched within a conception of wisdom as ‘the rightly determined theological understanding of 
Christ.’ Theology is, however, already a post-hermeneutic endeavor.  
Theological hermeneutics appeals to critical realism to establish the grounds of 
hermeneutic realism. Critical realism alone, cannot address the issue of the Criterion of Truth; it 
can only assert that reality exists beyond human understanding. As Alypius asked, “But who will 
indicate truth for us?”403 Without an answer to that question, even the hermeneutic realist is like 
the Academics in saying “If you devote yourself to [hermeneutics] you will never indeed be wise 
while you live here…your spirit will enjoy wisdom unencumbered in the [eschaton],404 that is, 
when you will have ceased to be an [interpreter].”405  
Augustine understood that for proclamation to be both possible and meaningful it must 
offer a Criterion. He understood Christ’s declaration “I am the Truth” to be a direct 
epistemological claim – not a theological claim.  
 
402 Morna D. Hooker, “Where Is Wisdom to Be Found?,” in Reading Texts, Seeking Wisdom, ed. David E. Ford and 
Graham Stanton (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 127. (Italics original). 
403pg. 87 above. 
404 “Here I need only add that one should pursue the quest for the single correct interpretation under the aegis of 
hope and its reminder ‘Not yet.’” Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the 
Morality of Literary Knowledge, 1998, 465. 
405 Modified quote from Mag. pg. 89 above. 
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Augustine addresses the epistemological question: How can humans be wise, “having 
knowledge of the human and divine”?406 – The Incarnate Christ, who was both (C. Acad.).  
Augustine addresses the hermeneutical question: How can we know the ‘res’ of the 
Creator through the indication of the ‘given sign’? – The Incarnate Christ, as logos, who was 
both (Mag., Doc. chr.).  
“But of [the search for wisdom] we should have been wholly incapable, had not Wisdom 
condescended to adapt Himself to our weakness … And thus, though Wisdom was Himself our 
home, He made Himself also the way by which we should reach our home.”407 
 This thesis has sought to build a compelling argument for the contemporary relevance of 
work from late antiquity. For the hermeneutic focus of this work it has been shown, at minimum, 
that there was nothing naïve, simplistic, or ‘immediate’ in the theoretical construction of 
Augustine’s hermeneutic. Arguably, in certain areas of development, his conception may exceed 
the current prevailing theories. There is value in examining work from our premodern 
forebearers for assistance with contemporary conundrums.  
 If postmodernity rightly identifies the deficiencies of modern methodologies to describe 
and define human communication, there are two possibilities for future development. The first 
option is to embrace deconstruction; to accept that humanity is a perpetual closed circuit of 
 
406 See pg. 83 above. 
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phenomenological objectivity, unable to truly interact with any other. Without a reliable (or 
worse, with a continually deceitful) hermeneutic with which to reach another subject, truth and 
wisdom can only be declared within the framework of individual experience, emotion and 
cognitive development. If this is the case, we must re-evaluate the possibility, purpose, and mode 
of flourishing with the impossibility of the basic anthropological need for relationship and 
interaction. 
 The second option is to accept that whatever the failings of scientific and positivistic 
methodologies are, they are failed descriptions – not determinations of failure. As Wittgenstein 
realized, humanity has amazing communicative abilities, it makes no difference if we are in 
possession of an adequate theory to account for the phenomena. If this is the case, we must be 
open to evaluating theories based on their ability to describe what is always and already 
occurring, not based on their cohesiveness or coherence within a pre-determined methodology. 
 For the contemporary theologian, (either by profession, or inclination) this is a crucial 
issue. If God speaks, if God desires to reveal Himself to His own creation, would it not stand to 
reason that His creation would possess the hermeneutic capacity to interact, reciprocate, and 
emulate that attribute? Or, is God simply another object in a pantheon of objects - dependent on 
our individual wisdom and subjective interpretation? 
 Augustine was not content to allow the Incarnate God to be the object of any subjective 
interpretation.  The Incarnate is not even the object of wisdom, the Incarnate God is wisdom 
itself. For Augustine, Christ is not a passive idea open to discovery by the astute subject; but is 
instead the author and originator of our existence and its underlying order. Christ is also the 
word, or sign, that indicates the underlying order of existence to those that will search for it. He 
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is the arbiter, the teacher and the guide to those that would seek to abide in Truth. The Incarnate 
is never the object, but is the subject on whom all other subjects depend for their possibility of 
being.  
 Augustine, from his premodern vantage-point gives us different perspectives, not only on 
individual topics, such as this project, but gives an example of being a wholistic thinker 
dedicated to understanding and applying the Gospel. He is never content to divide subject 
domains but holds any and all realms of human thought and activity to critical examination in 
light of the Incarnate Christ. The theoretical, theological, ethical, and practical cannot be parsed 
or opposed but must align within the created order.  Augustine offers us unique, insightful, and 
challenging analysis of humanity’s situation that still engages the postmodern world. He also 
offers an example of how to be a wholistic Christian thinker, also still needed in the postmodern 
world.   
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